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Can Congress Use Its War Powers to Protect Military
Employees from State Sovereign Immunity?
Jeffrey M. Hirsch∗
The need to attract and keep soldiers has never been greater, yet that
necessity is threatened by the Supreme Court’s burgeoning state sovereign
immunity jurisprudence. Congress has sought to promote military service
in the Uniformed Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act
(“USERRA”), which protects soldiers from adverse employment actions
based on their military status. Although USERRA is clearly intended to
apply to state employers, the Court’s dicta that Congress cannot abrogate
state sovereign immunity under Article I of the Constitution appear to
emasculate that aim. This Article, however, argues that the Court’s recent
holdings show that USERRA’s abrogation, enacted pursuant to Congress’s
war powers, is an exception to the general prohibition against abrogation
under Article I. The validity of war powers abrogation is supported by the
historical importance of a unified national defense—well recognized
during the plan of the Constitutional Convention and by the Court
itself—which reveals that the states did not expect to possess immunity
where the federal government exercises its war powers. This issue is
important, for, as this Article details, few suitable alternatives exist for
military personnel who are deprived of their USERRA rights by state
employers. Indeed, unless war abrogation is upheld, or Congress acts to
secure conditional waivers of state immunity, military employees in only a
few states will have the level of protection deemed necessary by Congress.

The use of noncareer military personnel for active duty
assignments has become more prevalent as the United States has
both reduced the number of full-time soldiers and increased its
military involvement throughout the world. Indeed, to address the
conflict in Iraq, as well as threats in Afghanistan, North Korea, and
other parts of the world, the United States placed over 300,000
members of the Reserves and National Guard on active duty since
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1

September 11, 2001. The soldiers being called up now are also
facing increased time on active duty, with current predictions of two
2
3
years. Moreover, unlike soldiers in earlier conflicts, those who
eventually leave active duty and return to civilian life now face an
additional hardship: the Supreme Court’s burgeoning state sovereign
immunity jurisprudence, which has greatly expanded the power of
state employers to avoid liability under many federal employment
statutes, even where Congress expressly permitted private lawsuits
4
against states.
At a time when the nation is increasing its use of noncareer
1

Kristen Downey, Reservists Filing Complaints, WASH. POST, Nov. 11, 2003, at E11
(stating that 306,000 members of the Reserves and National Guard had been called
to active duty). As of November 26, 2003 the Department of Defense had 132,667
members of the Reserves or National Guard on active duty. See News Release, Dep’t
of Def., National Guard and Reserve Mobilized as of Nov. 26, 2003, at
http://www.defenselink.mil/releases/2003/nr20031125-0704.html (last visited Mar.
9, 2004); see also USERRA Legal Inquiries Up Regarding Jobs; DOL Says Possible Rise in
Claims Expected, 63 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A-12 (Apr. 2, 2003) [hereinafter
USERRA Legal Inquiries Up] (stating that over 280,000 people have been called to
active duty since September 2001); Associated Press, Pentagon Lost Track of Reservists,
WASH. POST, Aug. 22, 2003, at A4 (stating that about 300,000 reservists had been
called to active duty since September 11, 2001); Thomas E. Ricks & Vernon Loeb,
Unrivaled Military Feels Strains of Unending War, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2003, at A18
(describing the strains felt by soldiers who are often required to go on back-to-back
deployments, the decreasing number of active duty members of the armed forces,
and the increased number of military interventions over the past decade). The Army
Chief of Staff estimated before fighting began in the second Iraqi conflict that the
military will need “several hundred thousand” soldiers in Iraq after the conflict ends,
although the Pentagon subsequently disagreed, putting the number as 100,000. See
Eric Schmitt, Pentagon Contradicts General on Iraq Occupation Force’s Size, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 28, 2003, at A1 (noting estimate by Gen. Erik K. Shinseki). The Pentagon’s
most recent estimate is that 156,000 United States soldiers will be needed in Iraq
through at least 2004. See Vernon Loeb, Pentagon Unveils Plan to Bolster Forces in Iraq,
WASH. POST, July 24, 2003, at A8. Further, the most recent Department of Defense
statistics show that there are 1,236,000 members of the Reserves or National Guard,
and 1,385,116 active members of the armed services. See DEP’T OF DEF., SELECTED
MANPOWER STATISTICS: FISCAL YEAR 2001, at 18, 155 (noting numbers as of September
30, 2001), available at http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/m01/fy01/m01fy01.pdf (last
visited Mar. 9, 2004).
2
See Robert Burns, Reserves May Get Alert on Iraq War (Nov. 19, 2002) (estimating
that from 185,000 to 285,000 reservists would be required), available at
http://www.cqservices.com/MyCQ/News/Default.asp?V=2121 (last visited Mar. 9,
2004); Vernon Loeb & Steve Vogel, Reserve Tours Are Extended, WASH. POST, Sept. 9,
2003, at A1 (describing order that reservists and Guard members called to active duty
must serve twelve months on the ground in Iraq or nearby, and that the tours may be
extended to two years).
3
During the 1991 Persian Gulf conflict, over 265,000 reservists were called to
active duty. See National Guard Association of the United States website, Major
National Guard Callups (stating that 265,322 reservists were called), at
http://www.ngaus.org/newsroom/guard101-callups.asp (last visited Mar. 9, 2004).
4
See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).

2004

WAR POWERS

1001

personnel and deploying them for longer periods of time, the Court’s
state immunity decisions threaten the federal government’s ability to
attract, and keep, such soldiers. That goal underlies the Uniformed
Services Employment and Reemployment Rights Act (“USERRA”),
which guarantees leaves of absence for training, provides the right to
reemployment after active duty, and prohibits discrimination based
5
on an employee’s military status. Although the need for USERRA is
6
growing, its ability to further the nation’s military needs by
7
protecting military employees may be undermined if the Court
permits states to avoid liability under the Act by invoking their
8
sovereign immunity.
5

See infra notes 72-74 and accompanying text (describing USERRA’s statutory
purposes).
6
See USERRA Legal Inquiries Up, supra note 1, at A-12 (stating that USERRA
complaints have increased by about thirty percent since the increase in callups after
September 11, 2001—a percentage comparable to the increase after the 1991 Persian
Gulf conflict); see also Official Says DOL Receiving Fewer USERRA Complaints Than Period
After 1991 Gulf War, 221 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A-12 (Nov. 17, 2003) (stating that
the Department of Labor received 1,315 USERRA complaints during fiscal year 2003,
compared to 2,500 complaints in fiscal year 1991); Downey, supra note 1, at E11
(noting that the approximately 1,300 complaints in fiscal year 2003 was up from nine
hundred complaints in 2001).
7
This Article refers to military service members who are working, or seeking
work, in civilian positions as “military employees.”
8
Recent congressional statements made on behalf of a 1998 amendment to
USERRA emphasized the importance of protecting state military employees. See infra
notes 222-23 and accompanying text (describing amendment that sought to ensure
USERRA’s enforcement against state employers); see also 144 CONG. REC. H1396,
H1398-99 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. Filner) (stating that because
“members of the Reserve and National Guard are a critical component of our
national defense,” Congress should pass bill that restores USERRA protection to state
employees after Seminole Tribe). For example, Rep. Evans made clear the importance
of fully protecting state military employees’ rights under USERRA:
Federal law must assure that the appropriate remedies are available
when violations of [USERRA] threaten our Nation’s ability to obtain
and attract a strong military force. . . . By passing [the amendment
ensuring protection for state employees] we are fulfilling our duty to
provide for the common defense of our Nation . . . [and] we are
fulfilling our Constitutional duty to “provide for the common Defence”
of our nation. With the need to utilize the resources of the National
Guard and Reserves to meet our Total Force military responsibilities, it
is essential that those who volunteer to serve our country be protected
by adequate safeguards of their right to obtain and retain suitable
civilian employment. The United States has a strong national interest
in assuring that its military readiness will not be undermined by
policies and practices which can deter competent and qualified citizens
from military service. . . . The ability of the United States to attract and
retain the competent and qualified personnel necessary to meet our
national security interests will be undermined absent a remedy [against
state employers] . . . .
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At present, a state military employee’s ability to bring a USERRA
action against a state remains an open question, as the few decisions
9
examining that issue are in disagreement. No court, however, has
fully considered the impact of the Supreme Court’s most recent state
sovereign immunity decisions on USERRA’s abrogation. Thus, the
question remains whether USERRA, which was enacted pursuant to
Congress’s war powers, provides an exception to the Court’s generally
dim view of Article I abrogation.
This Article argues that, despite Supreme Court dicta suggesting
that Congress can never abrogate state immunity under its Article I
10
powers, the Court’s own holdings, and its most influential historical
evidence, indicate that war powers abrogation is constitutional. In
short, the unique nature of the federal government’s war powers visà-vis the states—as illustrated by the colonial period, the
constitutional ratification debates, and the Constitution’s text—shows
that the states did not believe that they possessed immunity where the
federal government exercises its war powers. Because the Court has
11
recently held that these historical beliefs are determinative,
USERRA’s abrogation of state immunity under the federal war
powers is valid.
Part I of this Article describes the Supreme Court’s recent state
sovereign immunity jurisprudence. Part II then argues that, under
that jurisprudence, USERRA’s war powers abrogation is
constitutional. Finally, Part III explores alternate means of enforcing
USERRA should its abrogation be invalidated, and it recommends
congressional action to ensure full state compliance with the Act.
I.

THE SUPREME COURT’S NEW FEDERALISM JURISPRUDENCE

A. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida
The starting point for the Supreme Court’s recent state
sovereign immunity jurisprudence is the Eleventh Amendment and
12
the Court’s interpretation of it in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida.
Id. at H1397-98 (statement of Rep. Evans).
9
See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
10
See infra note 94 and accompanying text.
11
See infra notes 106-21 and accompanying text.
12
517 U.S. 44 (1996) (addressing abrogation of state immunity in the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1994); 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721
(1994)). For a more thorough analysis of Seminole Tribe and Eleventh Amendment
jurisprudence, see Daniel J. Meltzer, The Seminole Decision and State Sovereign
Immunity, 1996 SUP. CT. REV. 1, and Carlos Manuel Vazquez, What is Eleventh
Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997).
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Enacted to overrule the Court’s 1793 Chisholm v. Georgia decision,
the Eleventh Amendment declares that “[t]he Judicial power of the
United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or
equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by
Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign
14
State.”
As Seminole Tribe openly acknowledged, the Court has not felt
15
bound by the literal text of the Amendment. Rather, the Court has
continued to uphold an expansive interpretation of the Eleventh
16
Amendment that began with Hans v. Louisiana, which held that the
federal courts lacked jurisdiction over a suit brought against a state by
one of its own citizens—even though the Amendment speaks only to
suits by citizens of another state or country. Despite its general
willingness to broadly construe the Eleventh Amendment, the Court
had curbed its reach where Congress permitted a private right of
action against nonconsenting states. In particular, the Court held in
17
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. that Congress could validly abrogate
18
state immunity pursuant to the Interstate Commerce Clause.
Because the Commerce Clause withholds power from the
States at the same time as it confers it on Congress, and because
the congressional power thus conferred would be incomplete
without the authority to render States liable in damages, it must
be that, to the extent that the States gave Congress the authority
to regulate commerce, they also relinquished their immunity
where Congress found it necessary, in exercising this authority, to
19
render them liable.

War powers abrogation provided little controversy under Union
Gas, for Congress’s authority to abrogate state immunity pursuant to
20
its commerce and war powers was equal. In Seminole Tribe, however,
13

2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793) (holding that federal jurisdiction existed over a suit
by a South Carolina citizen seeking payment of a debt by the State of Georgia).
14
U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
15
See 517 U.S. at 54.
16
134 U.S. 1 (1890) (holding that a state can invoke sovereign immunity against
a suit by one of its own citizens for breach of contract).
17
491 U.S. 1 (1989).
18
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce . . . among the several States . . . .”).
19
491 U.S. at 19-20.
20
See, e.g., Reopell v. Massachusetts, 936 F.2d 12, 16 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding, preSeminole Tribe, that the Supreme Court’s “rationale for holding that the Commerce
Clause enactments abrogate the Eleventh Amendment equally supports War Power
abrogation”); Jennings v. Ill. Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 1979)
(holding, pre-Seminole Tribe, that USERRA’s abrogation was valid because “Congress
was exercising legislative authority that is plenary within the terms of the
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the Court overruled Union Gas and held that Congress’s attempt to
abrogate state sovereign immunity in the Indian Gaming Regulatory
21
22
Act, which was enacted under the Indian Commerce Clause,
violated the Eleventh Amendment.
Writing for the Court in Seminole Tribe, Chief Justice Rehnquist
directly addressed the central issue underlying Congress’s power to
abrogate: whether the Eleventh Amendment grants states
constitutional immunity or merely common-law protection
susceptible to congressional abrogation. According to the Court, the
immunity is constitutional and “the background principle of state
sovereign immunity embodied in the Eleventh Amendment is not so
ephemeral as to dissipate when the subject of the suit is in an area . . .
23
that is under the exclusive control of the Federal Government.”
Despite the significance of its holding that states’ sovereign
immunity was constitutional in nature, Seminole Tribe did not preclude
all congressional attempts to abrogate. Rather, the Court explicitly
24
reemphasized the validity of Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, another decision
authored by then-Justice Rehnquist, in which the Court held that
Congress could abrogate state immunity pursuant to the Fourteenth
25
Amendment.
In upholding Fitzpatrick, the Court distinguished congressional
attempts to abrogate under the Fourteenth Amendment versus the
Commerce Clauses.
The Court first noted that, unlike the
26
Commerce Clauses, Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment
27
expressly prohibited certain state actions, and Section 5 gave
Congress the power to enforce Section 1; thus, the Amendment

Constitutional (war powers) grant”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
21
18 U.S.C. §§ 1166-1168 (1994); 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2721 (1994).
22
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate
Commerce . . . with the Indian Tribes . . . .”).
23
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72; accord Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports
Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002). For criticism of Seminole Tribe’s holding that state
sovereign immunity is constitutionally required, see, for example, Seminole Tribe, 517
U.S. at 82-83 (Souter, J., dissenting); Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234,
259-90 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting); and Vicki C. Jackson, Seminole Tribe, the
Eleventh Amendment, and the Potential Evisceration of Ex parte Young, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV.
495, 507-08 (1997).
24
427 U.S. 445 (1976) (upholding abrogation under Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964).
25
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
26
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (stating, in part, that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws”).
27
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5 (“The Congress shall have the power to enforce,
by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.”).
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expanded federal power at the “expense of state autonomy.” Then,
the Court stressed that the Fourteenth Amendment’s expansion of
congressional power vis-à-vis the states occurred after the Eleventh
Amendment’s ratification:
Fitzpatrick was based upon a rationale wholly inapplicable to
the Interstate Commerce Clause, viz., that the Fourteenth
Amendment, adopted well after the adoption of the Eleventh
Amendment and the ratification of the Constitution, operated to
alter the pre-existing balance between state and federal power
29
achieved by Article III and the Eleventh Amendment.
30

Although this chronological distinction is less than satisfying,
Seminole Tribe made clear that the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act’s
abrogation violated the Eleventh Amendment because Congress
31
acted under the earlier-ratified Indian Commerce Clause.
The
Court concluded that, under its chronological analysis, “[e]ven when
the Constitution vests in Congress complete law-making authority
over a particular area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents
congressional authorization [under Article I] of suits by private
32
parties against unconsenting States.”
Finally, on a more practical note, the Court in Seminole Tribe
established a two-step analysis for determining whether Congress
validly abrogated state sovereign immunity. The first step is to assess
whether Congress “‘unequivocally expresse[d] its intent to abrogate
33
the immunity.’” Then, if the intent to abrogate is clear, the next
step is to examine “whether Congress has acted ‘pursuant to a valid
34
exercise of power.’” In short, if Congress clearly granted a private
right of action against nonconsenting states, did it have the power to
do so?

28

Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59.
Id. at 65-66.
30
See Ann Althouse, The Alden Trilogy: Still Searching for a New Way to Enforce
Federalism, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 631, 644 & n.62 (2000) (“It is difficult to see why the
subsequent enactment of the Eleventh Amendment undercuts evidence from the
ratification period.”); Meltzer, supra note 12, at 21-23.
31
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65-66.
32
Id. at 72.
33
Id. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
34
Id. (quoting Green, 474 U.S. at 68); see also id. at 59 (“Was the Act in question
passed pursuant to a constitutional provision granting Congress the power to
abrogate?”).
29
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B. Weighing State Sovereign Immunity Against Congressional
Abrogation
Following Seminole Tribe, the Court has addressed congressional
abrogation of state sovereign immunity under several employment
35
statutes, principally ones enacted pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Although USERRA was enacted under Congress’s
36
Article I war powers rather than the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court’s analyses in those cases display an explicit balancing of
interests that are relevant to the validity of war powers abrogation. In
particular, USERRA’s importance to the nation’s military needs may
provide a rare situation for the Court to tip the balance away from
state sovereign immunity concerns and toward Congress’s goals in
abrogating that immunity.
It must first be noted that the curtailment of Congress’s
abrogation power coincided with new restrictions on its ability to
enact legislation under the Fourteenth Amendment. In City of Boerne
37
v. Flores, the Court held that Congress’s power to enforce the
Fourteenth Amendment is only remedial and cannot alter the scope
of constitutional rights; defining those rights is the role of courts
38
alone.
The key holding in Boerne was that the determination
35

See Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003) (holding that
individuals can sue state employers for monetary damages under Family and Medical
Leave Act); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001) (holding
that individuals cannot sue state employers for monetary damages under the
Americans with Disabilities Act); Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000)
(same, under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S.
706 (1999) (same, under the Fair Labor Standards Act). Although the Supreme
Court has yet to address abrogation in other employment statutes, there is a
substantial body of law from other courts that has done so. For example, most postSeminole Tribe courts have upheld abrogation under the Equal Pay Act of 1963, 29
U.S.C. §§ 203(e)(2)(C), 206(d) (2000). See, e.g., Varner v. Ill. State Univ., 226 F.3d
927 (7th Cir. 2000); Hundertmark v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 205 F.3d 1272 (11th Cir.
2000); O’Sullivan v. Minnesota, 191 F.3d 965 (8th Cir. 1999); Anderson v. State Univ.
of N.Y., 169 F.3d 117 (2d Cir. 1999), vacated and remanded by 528 U.S. 1111 (2000)
(citing Kimel), on remand, 107 F. Supp. 2d 158 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (holding abrogation to
be valid); Ussery v. Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431 (5th Cir. 1998); Timmer v. Mich. Dep’t of
Commerce, 104 F.3d 833, 837 (6th Cir. 1997).
36
See infra note 102.
37
521 U.S. 507 (1997). In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court held that neutral, generally
applicable laws do not have to show a compelling government interest to apply to
religious practices. Congress sought to reverse Smith’s interpretation of the First
Amendment by enacting the Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”),
Boerne held that RFRA was
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
unconstitutional. Boerne, 521 U.S. 507.
38
521 U.S. at 519; see also Althouse, supra note 30, at 674; Christopher L.
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whether Congress exceeded its remedial power turns on the
“proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the
39
legitimate end to be achieved.”
Boerne’s impact on state sovereign immunity abrogation was not
necessarily apparent at the time, for the Court also emphasized that
“[l]egislation which deters or remedies constitutional violations can
fall within the sweep of Congress’ [Fourteenth Amendment]
enforcement power even if in the process it prohibits conduct which
is not itself unconstitutional and intrudes into ‘legislative spheres of
40
autonomy previously reserved to the States.’” The Court, however,
subsequently embarked on an explicit balancing of Congress’s
Fourteenth Amendment power against the states’ sovereign immunity
interests and, despite Boerne’s deferential language, the states’
immunity concerns have generally prevailed.
In its examinations of various employment statutes, the Court
has reemphasized the validity of Congress’s power to abrogate state
41
immunity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and
cursorily rejected abrogation under the Fair Labor Standards Act
42
(“FLSA”). The Court’s more comprehensive employment decisions
Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Congressional Power and Religious Liberty After City of
Boerne v. Flores, 1997 SUP. CT. REV. 79, 86-87.
39
521 U.S. at 533; see Samuel Estreicher & Margaret H. Lemos, The Section 5
Mystique, Morrison, and the Future of Federal Antidiscrimination Law, 2000 SUP. CT. REV.
109 (discussing, in part, the relationship between the Court’s Fourteenth
Amendment limits and state sovereign immunity).
40
Boerne, 521 U.S. at 518 (quoting Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976)).
At least one commentator did note the potential negative impact on federal
employment statutes. See Joanne C. Brant, Seminole Tribe, Flores and State Employees:
Reflections on a New Relationship, 2 EMPLOYEE RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 175 (1998)
(predicting that Boerne would eliminate most federal employment protections for
state employees).
41
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994); see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59, 65-66
(reemphasizing the validity of Fitzpatrick, which upheld Congress’s power to abrogate
state immunity under Title VII’s prohibition against intentional race discrimination);
Ussery v. Louisiana, 150 F.3d 431, 434-35 (5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting argument that
Title VII’s abrogation of state immunity was not clear and reaffirming the relevancy
of Fitzpatrick after Seminole Tribe). Doubts could be raised, however, about whether
Title VII’s abrogation is valid where it prohibits disparate impact discrimination. See
Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 38, at 90-91 (arguing that Boerne permits Congress to
authorize private disparate impact race discrimination claims against states).
42
29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1994); see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding
that Congress could not allow individuals to pursue a FLSA claim for money damages
against a nonconsenting state in state court). Congress’s struggle to apply the FLSA
to the states provides a good illustration of the difficulties caused by the Court’s
changing sovereign immunity jurisprudence. After the Court held in 1973 that the
FLSA did not clearly state an intent to abrogate state immunity, see Employees v. Mo.
Pub. Health Dep’t, 411 U.S. 279, 285 (1973), Congress amended the Act to make its
intent to abrogate clear, see 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (1974). In 1976, however, the Court
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initially involved statutes prohibiting discrimination based on age and
disability. In those two cases, the Court acknowledged Congress’s
explicit attempt to provide national protection for employees—
including those who work for state employers—but concluded that
Congress’s power to achieve its goals was overwhelmed by state
sovereign immunity interests. That emphasis on state immunity
interests was finally curbed, however, by the Court’s subsequent
decision upholding private rights of action against state employers to
enforce federal family medical leave requirements.
43
In Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents, the Court held that
Congress’s abrogation of state immunity under the Age
44
Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”) was unconstitutional.
Kimel was notable for its explicit balancing of state immunity interests
against individual rights, as the Court focused its criticism on
Congress’s failure to show that state employers, rather than
employers in general, were engaging in a pattern of unconstitutional
45
age discrimination.
The central issue in Kimel was whether the ADEA’s abrogation
was a “congruent and proportional” exercise of Congress’s

held that Congress could not extend the FLSA to state employees in “areas of
traditional governmental functions.” Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833,
852 (1976). In 1985, the Court reversed course and held that the FLSA covered all
state employees. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985).
43
528 U.S. 62 (2000).
44
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1994). Congress passed the ADEA in 1967, and it
originally applied only to private employers. See id. § 630(b) (1970) (excluding as an
“employer” the “United States . . . or a State or political subdivision thereof”). The
Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1974 amended the ADEA’s definition of
“employer” to include “a State or political subdivision of a State and any agency or
instrumentality of a State or a political subdivision of a State.” Id. § 630(b) (1994); see
also id. § 626(b) (incorporating id. § 216(b), which permits an individual to bring a
civil action “against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State
court of competent jurisdiction”); id. § 203(x) (defining “public agency” as “the
government of a State or political subdivision thereof . . . [and] any agency of . . . a
State, or political subdivision of a State”).
45
The Court never addressed why Congress would have provided such evidence,
given that it had no reason to believe that such findings were necessary at the time.
More importantly, the Court failed to acknowledge that its retroactive application of
Seminole Tribe may ignore evidence of state discrimination that existed, but that
Congress was never compelled to seek out or present. See Vikram David Amar &
Samuel Estreicher, Conduct Unbecoming a Coordinate Branch, 4 GREEN BAG 2D 351, 355
(2001) (noting that congressional findings for the ADA may have found more state
violations if Congress knew of their subsequent significance). However, in
reformulating USERRA’s application to state employers, Congress did note that after
Seminole Tribe, several federal courts had held that USERRA’s abrogation was invalid.
See, e.g., 144 CONG. REC. H1398, H1398 (Mar. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep. Evans).
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46

Fourteenth Amendment power.
In spite of the obvious
congressional intent to apply the statute to state employers, the Court
held that “the substantive requirements that the ADEA imposes on
state and local governments are disproportionate to any
unconstitutional conduct that conceivably could be targeted by the
47
Act.”
Underlying that conclusion was the Court’s holding that the type
of class being protected directly affects the “congruence and
48
proportionality” of a statute’s application to state employers. The
ADEA suffered under that analysis, for age bias is entitled only to
rational basis review, rather than the strict or heightened scrutiny of
49
other classifications.
Accordingly, because the ADEA prohibited
age-based classifications that were likely rationally related to a
legitimate state interest, its abrogation of state immunity was “so out
of proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object that it
cannot be understood as responsive to, or designed to prevent,

46

Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83.
Id. But see id. at 93, 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is the Framers’ compromise
giving each State equal representation in the Senate that provides the principal
structural protection for the sovereignty of the several States. . . . [O]nce Congress
has made its policy choice, the sovereignty concerns of the several States are satisfied
. . . .”).
48
See id. at 83; see also Kazmier v. Widmann, 225 F.3d 519, 524 (5th Cir. 2000).
But see id. at 535-41 (Dennis, J., dissenting) (arguing that Kimel and Boerne did not
substantively change Congress’s enforcement power under the Fourteenth
Amendment where a suspect or quasi-suspect class is at issue—there need only be a
rational basis for Congress’s action).
49
See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 83 (citing Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); Vance
v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979); Mass. Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307
(1976)). Under rational basis review, a state may discriminate based on age without
violating the Fourteenth Amendment if the classification is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest—that is, states may “draw lines on the basis of age when they
have a rational basis for doing so at a class-based level, even if it is ‘probably not true’
that those reasons are valid in the majority of cases.” Id. The relevance of this
reasoning is not immediately apparent, for the ADEA allows similar discrimination
under its bona fide occupational quality defense. See 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1) (2000).
The Court, however, held that the bona fide occupational defense is different from
rational basis review because the former requires a showing of “reasonable necessity”
and shifts the burden to the state. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 86-87. The Court also noted
that rational basis review allows states to use age as a proxy for other policies, while
the ADEA does not. See id. (citing 29 U.S.C. § 623(f)(1)). Yet, it is puzzling why the
Court weighed states’ immunity interests against general age-based policies, rather
than individual claims of unconstitutional age discrimination. Such an analysis
suggests that Congress could find a pattern of age discrimination against individuals
by states, but is powerless to address that pattern as long as the discrimination occurs
under policies that have a rational basis as applied to the majority of, but not all,
older workers.
47
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50

unconstitutional behavior.”
The Court acknowledged that Congress’s enforcement power
under the Fourteenth Amendment is not limited to remedying
51
constitutional violations, and therefore examined “whether the
ADEA is in fact just an appropriate [prophylactic] remedy or, instead,
merely an attempt to substantively redefine the States’ legal
52
obligation with respect to age discrimination.” Noting the legislative
history’s failure to cite evidence of a pattern of state age
discrimination—even though Congress extended the ADEA to state
employers in 1979, well before it had any reason to believe that such
evidence was necessary—the Court held “that Congress had virtually
no reason to believe that state and local governments were
unconstitutionally discriminating against their employees on the basis
53
of age.” Given the lack of such a pattern, Congress’s abrogation of
state immunity was not congruent and proportional to the ADEA’s
“broad prophylactic legislation,” and therefore violated the Eleventh
54
Amendment.
Kimel aptly demonstrated that in a balance between deference to
Congress and state sovereign immunity, the latter is paramount. The
prominence of state immunity vis-à-vis congressional prerogatives was
50

Kimel, 528 U.S. at 82-83 (quoting Boerne, 521 U.S. at 532).
Id. at 88 (“Difficult and intractable problems often require powerful remedies,
and we have never held that § 5 precludes Congress from enacting reasonably
prophylactic legislation.”).
52
Id.
53
Id. at 91. Although it noted Congress’s ability to provide a broad remedy
against possible constitutional violations, the Court repeatedly invoked the dearth of
evidence indicating a pattern of constitutional violations. See, e.g., id. (“Congress’
failure to uncover any significant pattern of unconstitutional discrimination . . .
confirms that [it] had no reason to believe that broad prophylactic legislation was
necessary.”). That requirement ignores both Congress’s ability to address injuries
that do not violate the constitution and the very meaning of “prophylactic.” It
appears difficult to prove that prophylactic legislation is necessary if the only means
to do so is through evidence that the targeted problem was already widespread. But
see Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1983 (2003) (holding that
prophylactic abrogation in the FMLA was valid because earlier attempts to remedy
gender-based discrimination had failed). Moreover, by requiring proof of a pattern
of constitutional violations by the states, particularly after a statute’s enactment, the
Court drastically increased its willingness to challenge Congress’s factfinding and
legislative prerogatives. See Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
380 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“In reviewing § 5 legislation, we have never
required the sort of extensive investigation of each piece of evidence that the Court
appears to contemplate.”). Indeed, whether courts are suited to identify and remedy
discrimination that occurs throughout various parts of the country is debatable. See
id. at 380-85 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that courts are ill-suited to make such
findings).
54
Kimel, 528 U.S. at 91.
51
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further illustrated in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v.
55
Garrett, where the Court struck down Congress’s abrogation of state
56
immunity in the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).
As in Kimel, the rational basis review used for disability
57
discrimination grounded the Court’s holding. Although the Court
acknowledged that prohibiting employment discrimination against
the disabled was generally a valid purpose under the Fourteenth
Amendment, it held that Congress again failed to show that
individuals needed protection against a pattern of unconstitutional
58
discrimination by states. Thus, according to the Court, permitting
individuals to sue states under the ADA was not congruent and
proportional to the injuries being targeted and, therefore, was
59
invalid.
55

531 U.S. 356 (2001).
42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (2000). Congress’s intent to abrogate state
immunity was undeniable; the ADA mandates that “[a] State shall not be immune
under the eleventh amendment to the Constitution of the United States from an
action in Federal or State court . . . .” Id. § 12202; see also Garrett, 531 U.S. at 364.
Moreover, the ADA provides a clear statement of Congress’s belief that it was enacted
pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment, for the Act declares that its purpose is “to
invoke the sweep of congressional authority, including the power to enforce the
fourteenth amendment, . . . [and] to address the major areas of discrimination faced
day-to-day by people with disabilities.” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(4); see Garrett, 531 U.S.
at 364 n.3.
57
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367 (citing Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473
U.S. 432, 446 (1985)). Garrett defined rational basis review as requiring a plaintiff to
show that there exists no “‘reasonably conceivable state of facts that could provide a
rational basis for the classification.’” Id. (quoting Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320
(1993)); see also id. at 387-88 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is difficult to understand
why the Court, which applies minimum rational-basis review to statutes that burden
people with disabilities, subjects to far stricter scrutiny a statute that seeks to help
those same individuals.”) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); Amar &
Estreicher, supra note 45, at 354-56 (criticizing Garrett for looking only to state, rather
than municipal and county, discrimination in employment).
58
See Garrett, 531 U.S. at 368. It is striking that, in finding no pattern of
discrimination, the Court dismissed a wealth of congressional findings on disability
discrimination because, with few exceptions, they did not involve states engaging in
such discrimination. See id. at 366-67. But see id. at 378-79 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“The powerful evidence of discriminatory treatment throughout society in general,
including discrimination by private persons and local governments, implicates state
governments as well, for state agencies form part of that larger society. . . .
[Moreover, t]here are roughly 300 examples of discrimination by state governments
themselves in the legislative record.”).
59
See id. at 374 (“Congress is the final authority as to desirable public policy, but
in order to authorize private individuals to recover money damages against the
States, there must be a pattern of discrimination by the States which violates the
Fourteenth Amendment, and the remedy imposed by Congress must be congruent
and proportional to the targeted violation. Those requirements are not met here . . .
.”); id. at 367-68 (“States are not required by the Fourteenth Amendment to make
special accommodations for the disabled, so long as their actions towards such
56
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In Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, the Court
confirmed the emphasis that Kimel and Garrett appeared to place on
the identity of a protected class. In Hibbs, the Court held that
Congress validly abrogated state immunity in the Family and Medical
61
Leave Act (“FMLA”). As the Court recognized, the FMLA “aims to
protect the right to be free from gender-based discrimination in the
62
63
Yet, unlike age and disability, gender-based
workplace.”
64
classifications are reviewed under a heightened scrutiny standard.
That difference was vital to the Court’s holding.
As it had done in Kimel and Garrett, the Court reviewed the
evidence of state discrimination that Congress relied on to abrogate
state immunity—this time evidence of discriminatory family medical
leave policies. Although the FMLA evidence was not substantially
65
different than that of the ADEA and ADA, the Court found that
“States’ record of unconstitutional participation in, and fostering of,
gender-based discrimination in the administration of leave benefits is
weighty enough to justify the enactment of prophylactic § 5
66
The Court made clear why it held that abrogation
legislation.”
individuals are rational.
They could quite hard headedly—and perhaps
hardheartedly—hold to job qualification requirements which do not make allowance
for the disabled.”). The Court also emphasized that the ADA’s protections extended
beyond the bounds of the Fourteenth Amendment by requiring “reasonable
accommodation” of disabled workers and by proscribing actions that “disparately
impact” those workers. Id. at 372-73.
60
123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003).
61
29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (2000). Congress clearly intended for the FMLA to
abrogate state immunity, as it permits private rights of action for money damages
“against any employer (including a public agency) in any Federal or State court of
competent jurisdiction.” Id. § 2617(a)(2). Although Hibbs, at a minimum, validated
the FMLA’s abrogation with regard to family leave requirements, some courts have
held that it left open the question whether the FMLA’s abrogation for personal leave
was valid. See, e.g., Brockman v. Wyo. Dep’t of Family Servs., 342 F.3d 1159, 1164
(10th Cir. 2003) (distinguishing Hibbs, and holding that the FMLA’s abrogation of
state immunity for personal leave was unconstitutional).
62
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978.
63
See supra notes 43-59 and accompanying text.
64
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1978 (citing Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197-99 (1976)).
The Court defined heightened scrutiny as requiring a classification to “‘serve
important governmental objectives,’ and ‘the discriminatory means employed [must
be] substantially related to the achievement of those objectives.’” Id. (quoting
United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996)).
65
See Vikram David Amar, The New “New Federalism,” 6 GREEN BAG 2D 349, 351-53
(2003) (noting similarities of evidence relied upon to pass the ADA and FMLA).
66
Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. at 1981. The Court relied on studies showing that private
employers provide more maternity than paternity leave, that leave policies in the
public and private sectors are similar, and that few of the states providing extended
maternity leave gave similar paternity leave; it also relied on testimony that public
and private sector leave policies are discriminatory and that most states provided no
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under the FMLA was valid but concluded that abrogation under the
ADEA and ADA was not: “Because the standard for demonstrating
the constitutionality of a gender-based classification is more difficult
to meet than our rational-basis test . . . it was easier for Congress to
67
show a pattern of state constitutional violations.”
Congress’s
attempt to remedy this pattern in the FMLA, therefore, was
68
congruent and proportional to the problem it targeted.
Garrett, Kimel, and Hibbs illustrate the Court’s insistence on a
statute-specific justification for Congress’s abrogation of state
69
immunity. That case-by-case review takes on particular significance
with regard to USERRA’s abrogation.
Because the federal
government’s war powers will no doubt garner more respect from the
Court than the ADEA and ADA—particularly when the nation is
engaged in war—USERRA may provide a rare instance where the
Court finds the need to abrogate more compelling than state
immunity.
II. STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY V. USERRA’S WAR POWERS
ABROGATION
A. USERRA Background
The United States has sought to protect the employment rights
70
of noncareer military personnel since World War II. In its latest
family medical leave. See id. at 1979-80. But see id. at 1985 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(arguing that to allow enforcement against a state, there must be a finding that the
particular state had a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination); id. at 1987-91
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (criticizing the evidence relied upon by the majority as not
showing a pattern of unconstitutional discrimination by the states).
67
Id. at 1982. The Court further noted that “[u]nlike the statutes in City of
Boerne, Kimel, and Garrett, which applied broadly to every aspect of state employers’
operations, the FMLA is narrowly targeted at the fault line between work and
family—precisely where sex-based overgeneralization has been and remains
strongest—and affects only one aspect of the employment relationship.” Id. at 1983.
68
See id. at 1982.
69
See Susan Bandes, Treaties, Sovereign Immunity, and the “Plan of the Convention,” 42
VA. J. INT’L L. 743, 745 (2002) (arguing that in “determining the scope of the
abrogation power, it is essential to identify the authority under which Congress acted
in order to know whether its attempt to subject the states to damage remedies is
constitutional”). But see Carlos Manuel Vazquez, Treaties and the Eleventh Amendment,
42 VA. J. INT’L L. 713, 726 n.69 (2002) [hereinafter Vazquez, Treaties] (disagreeing
with Bandes, and arguing that Congress’s power to abrogate does not depend on the
authority under which it acted).
70
See Lt. Col. H. Craig Manson, The Uniformed Services Employment and
Reemployment Rights Act of 1994, 47 A.F. L. REV. 55, 56-57 (1999) (noting that original
act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 308 (1946), repealed by Selective Service Act of 1948, ch. 624, 62
Stat. 625 (1948), was intended to prepare for the possibility of war and to enable
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form, USERRA, formerly known as the Veterans’ Reemployment
71
Rights Act (“VRRA”), is intended “to encourage noncareer service
in the uniformed services by eliminating or minimizing the
disadvantages to civilian careers and employment which can result
72
from such service.” The goal of “minimiz[ing] the disruption to the
lives of persons performing service in the uniformed services . . . [is
furthered] by providing for the prompt reemployment of such
73
persons upon their completion of such service,”
and by
“prohibit[ing] discrimination against persons because of their
74
service.”
USERRA provides reemployment rights to “any person whose
absence from a position of employment is necessitated by reason of
75
service in the uniformed services.” After such service, a military
employee is entitled to be “promptly reemployed in the position of
employment in which the person would have been employed” absent
the interruption, or in the position the person left if not qualified for
76
the “elevated” position.
Moreover, for up to one year after
77
reemployment, the military employee can be terminated only for
78
“just cause.”
The military employee is also entitled to the same
employment benefits as an employee on nonmilitary furlough or
service members to return to civilian jobs, and that subsequent amendments were
enacted to support the Cold War and the Vietnam conflict).
71
USERRA replaced VRRA, 38 U.S.C. §§ 2021-2027, on October 13, 1994.
USERRA was enacted to “clarify, simplify, and where necessary, strengthen the
existing veterans’ employment and re-employment rights provisions” of the former
VRRA. H.R. REP. NO. 103-65, at 19 (1994), reprinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2449, 2451.
72
38 U.S.C. § 4301(a)(1) (2000); see also Monroe v. Standard Oil Co., 452 U.S.
549, 559-60 (1981); Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, 90 F.3d 609, 613 (1st Cir.
1996).
73
38 U.S.C. § 4311(a)(2).
74
Id. § 4301(a)(3); Eve I. Klein & Maria Cilenti, When Duty Calls: What Obligations
Do Employers Have to Employees Who Are Called to Military Service?, 73 N.Y. ST. B. J. 10, 10
(2001); Manson, supra note 70, at 58 (noting need for reserve forces following
decrease in active duty service following end of Cold War).
75
38 U.S.C. § 4312(a). “Service in the uniformed services” covers “performance
of duty on a voluntary or involuntary basis in a uniformed service under competent
authority.” Id. § 4303(13) (including “active duty,” “active duty for training,” “initial
active duty for training,” “inactive duty training,” and “full-time National Guard
duty”). “Uniformed Service” includes service in the United States Armed Forces,
Army National Guard, Air National Guard, commissioned corps of the Public Health
Service, and any positions designated by the President during war or emergency. See
id. § 4303(16).
76
Id. § 4313(a)(1)(A).
77
The period of protection is one year if the military service was for over 180
days; the period is 180 days if the service was between 30 and 180 days. See id. §
4316(c).
78
See id. § 4316(c).
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79

leave, including health insurance coverage for up to eighteen
80
months.
Exceptions exist where an employer proves that
reemployment would be unreasonable or cause undue hardship to
the employer, the position was temporary, or there was legally
81
sufficient cause to terminate the employee before the military leave.
USERRA also forbids discrimination by prohibiting an employer
from denying “initial employment, reemployment, retention in
82
employment, promotion, or any benefit of employment” if a
person’s “membership, application for membership, service,
application for service, or obligation for service in the uniformed
services is a motivating factor in the employer’s action, unless the
employer can prove that the action would have been taken in the
83
absence of such . . . service.”
To prove discrimination under
USERRA, a plaintiff must show that military service was a “substantial
84
or motivating factor” in an adverse action.
It is well established that courts will liberally construe USERRA
85
in favor of the military employee. Where a violation is found, the
Act’s remedies include equitable relief, make-whole compensation,
86
liquidated damages, attorneys’ fees, and costs. In short, USERRA
provides substantial employment rights for those employees that have
served, or will have to serve, in the United States military. The extent
to which state military employees enjoy those rights is uncertain,
however. Although Congress has made clear its intent that USERRA
87
applies to state employers, the Supreme Court’s state sovereign
79

See id. §§ 4311, 4316(b)(1); Klein & Cilenti, supra note 74, at 11. Those
benefits include contributions to pension plans and calculation of service for such
plans as if the military employee was not on military leave. See 38 U.S.C. § 4318.
80
See 38 U.S.C. § 4317(a)(1)(A). However, after 31 days of leave, the employee
may be required to pay up to 102% of the premiums. See id. § 4317(a)(2).
81
See id. § 4312 (setting forth procedures that the military employee must follow
to qualify for reemployment rights); Klein & Cilenti, supra note 74, at 11.
82
38 U.S.C. § 4311(a).
83
The employer is also prohibited from taking adverse action in retaliation
against individuals’ attempts to enforce their rights under USERRA. See id. §
4311(c)(1).
84
See Gummo v. Vill. of Depew, N.Y., 75 F.3d 98, 106 (2d Cir. 1996); Klein &
Cilenti, supra note 74, at 14, 20 (noting that the “motivating factor” standard is
generally interpreted as mirroring the burden-shifting standard used in National
Labor Relations Board cases, such as NLRB v. Transp. Mgmt. Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 39495 (approving NLRB’s standard as expressed in Wright Line, 251 N.L.R.B. 1083
(1980))).
85
See Ala. Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 584 (1977); McGuire v. United Parcel
Serv., 152 F.3d 673, 675 (7th Cir. 1998).
86
See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(d), (e), (h).
87
See id. § 4303(4)(A)(iii) (defining “employer” to include a state); § 4323(b)
(permitting actions against state employers); § 4323(c)(2)(B)(7) (“Any person
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immunity jurisprudence threatens to significantly undermine state
military employees’ ability to exercise their rights under the Act.
B. War Powers Abrogation After Seminole Tribe
88

As discussed, the Court has taken an increasingly skeptical view
of congressional attempts to abrogate state sovereign immunity. In
striking down such efforts, the Court has balanced what it views as the
extraordinary importance of state sovereign immunity against the
89
lesser need to abrogate that immunity in a particular statute.
Abrogation under USERRA, however, presents a unique situation.
As argued below, Congress’s abrogation of state immunity
pursuant to its war powers is constitutionally valid, despite the Court’s
general disapproval of Article I abrogation. That conclusion follows
from the Court’s recent emphasis on states’ expectations when they
ratified the Constitution. The Founders’ intent that the nation
exercise its war powers with a single voice, which was advanced by
granting exclusive war powers to the federal government and
expressly limiting states’ powers, indicates that the plan of the
Constitution was not to allow states to thwart congressional war
powers enactments through claims of sovereign immunity.
As noted, Seminole Tribe created a two-part test for analyzing the
90
validity of a statute’s abrogation. USERRA clearly satisfies the first
requirement—whether Congress unequivocally expressed its intent to
91
abrogate state immunity —for the Act explicitly permits private suits
92
against states. The second requirement—whether that abrogation is
[employed by a State or political subdivision] shall not be denied . . . retention in
employment, or any promotion or other incident or advantage of employment
because of any obligation as a member of a Reserve component of the Armed
Forces.”).
88
See supra notes 12-68 and accompanying text.
89
See supra note 69.
90
See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
91
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
92
See supra note 87; see also Palmatier v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 981 F. Supp.
529, 531 (W.D. Mich. 1997). But cf. Forster v. SAIF Corp., 23 F. Supp. 2d 1196, 1197
(D. Or. 1998) (assuming, because of plaintiff’s concession, that Congress did not
abrogate state immunity under USERRA). Moreover, consistent with Supreme Court
precedent refusing to extend Eleventh Amendment immunity to municipalities and
counties, USERRA also permits federal suits against political subdivisions of a state.
See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(1) (2000) (granting federal jurisdiction over suits against a
“private employer,” which “includes a political division of a State”); Miller v. City of
Indianapolis, No. IP-99-1735-CMS, 2001 WL 406346, at *5 (S.D. Ind. Apr. 13, 2001),
aff’d, 281 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2002). Finally, as discussed infra notes 221-44 and
accompanying text, it is unclear whether USERRA currently abrogates state
immunity in federal court. The following discussion, however, still applies to
USERRA’s clear abrogation of state immunity in state courts, and to war powers
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valid—is in much greater dispute. Indeed, that question has created
a split between the two federal circuit courts that have addressed
93
USERRA’s application to state employers.
Much responsibility for those conflicting views may be placed on
Supreme Court dicta suggesting that Congress cannot abrogate state
immunity pursuant to any of its Article I powers. A typical example
states that Congress cannot “under Article I expand the scope of
94
federal courts’ jurisdiction under Article III.” The Court, however,
has never addressed whether war powers abrogation is an exception

abrogation generally.
93
See infra notes 96-105 and accompanying text.
94
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 65 (1996); see also Fed. Mar.
Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 761 (2002) (holding that states are
immune from federal administrative adjudication of a complaint filed against the
state by a private party because “it would be quite strange to prohibit Congress from
exercising its Article I powers to abrogate state sovereign immunity in Article III
judicial proceedings, see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72, but permit the use of those
same Article I powers to create court-like administrative tribunals where sovereign
immunity does not apply”); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356,
364 (2001) (“Congress may not, of course, base its abrogation of the States’ Eleventh
Amendment immunity upon the powers enumerated in Article I.”); Kimel v. Fla. Bd.
of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 78 (2000) (“In Seminole Tribe, we held that Congress lacks the
power under Article I to abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity.”); Alden v. Maine,
527 U.S. 706, 754 (2000); Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav.
Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636 (1999). Most lower courts subsequently addressing Article I
abrogation have relied on such dicta as a basis for finding war powers abrogation
invalid. See Ysleta Del Sur Pueblo v. Laney, 199 F.3d 281, 288 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing
Florida Prepaid in rejecting argument that Congress’s war powers justified the Indian
Non-Intercourse Act’s abrogation of state immunity); Palmatier v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 981 F. Supp. 529, 532 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (“Applying the lessons of
Seminole Tribe, it necessarily follows that Congress, acting under Article I, could not
effectively abrogate the states’ Eleventh Amendment immunity in USERRA.”);
Larkins v. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 806 So. 2d 358, 362-63 (Ala.
2001) (holding that “Alden forecloses, on constitutional grounds, resort to Article I as
the basis for subjecting the State of Alabama to suit [under USERRA] in a state court
on a remedy based on Congress’s assertion of its powers with respect to military
preparedness”). As explained below, however, those cases are undermined by the
Court’s subsequent holding in Alden, despite Alden’s restatement of that dictum. See
Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp., 319 F.3d 755, 761-62 (6th Cir.), cert. granted,
124 S. Ct. 45 (2003) (rejecting dicta in holding that Bankruptcy Act abrogation was
valid, although noting that five other circuits disagreed: Nelson v. La Crosse County
Dist. Attorney, 301 F.3d 820, 832-34 (7th Cir. 2002); Mitchell v. Franchise Tax Bd.,
209 F.3d 1111, 1120-21 (9th Cir. 2000); Sacred Heart Hosp. v. Pennsylvania, 133 F.3d
237, 242-43 (3d Cir. 1998); Fernandez v. PNL Asset Mgmt. Co., 123 F.3d 241, 243-45
(5th Cir.), amended by 130 F.3d 1138, 1138-39 (5th Cir. 1997); Schlossberg v.
Maryland, 119 F.3d 1140, 1145-46 (4th Cir. 1997)). Indeed, the Court’s most recent
restatement of this rule referred only to Congress’s Article I commerce power. See Nev.
Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972, 1977 (2003) (“Congress may not
abrogate the States’ sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I power over
commerce.”).
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95

to its general prohibition against Article I abrogation.
96
The First Circuit, in Diaz-Gandia v. Dapena-Thompson, expressly
refused to apply that dictum to USERRA and concluded that its
97
abrogation of state immunity was valid. The court held that Seminole
Tribe did not overrule an earlier First Circuit case that upheld war
98
powers abrogation, Reopell v. Massachusetts, because Seminole Tribe
addressed only Congress’s Interstate Commerce Clause power and
99
“does not control the War Powers analysis.” The court’s reliance on
Reopell is not entirely persuasive, for the basis of that decision was that
the Supreme Court’s “rationale for holding that the Commerce
Clause enactments abrogate the Eleventh Amendment equally
100
supports War Power abrogation.”
Seminole Tribe, of course, later
held that Congress could not abrogate pursuant to the Commerce
Clause, thereby undermining Reopell’s equation of Congress’s
commerce and war powers. Yet, as explained in the next section, the
Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Alden supports the First
Circuit’s reluctance to hold that Seminole Tribe effectively foreclosed
war powers abrogation.
101
In Velasquez v. Frapwell, Chief Judge Posner, writing for the
Seventh Circuit, more thoroughly examined USERRA’s abrogation
under Seminole Tribe and concluded that it was unconstitutional. The
central holding in Velasquez was that Congress’s war powers, like its
powers under the Commerce Clause and the rest of Article I,
predates the Eleventh Amendment’s reestablishment of states’
102
immunity against private suits.
Thus, only power granted to
Congress after the Eleventh Amendment’s ratification may be
95

See also Bandes, supra note 69, at 746 (arguing that this dictum should not be
taken literally because, in part, sovereign immunity may be overridden through
conditional waivers of state immunity obtained under Congress’s Spending Clause
power) (citing William A. Fletcher, The Eleventh Amendment: Unfinished Business, 75
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 843, 853 (2000)).
96
90 F.3d 609 (1st Cir. 1996).
97
Id. at 616 & n.9.
98
936 F.2d 12 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding that a state is liable for prejudgment
interest under the VRRA).
99
Diaz-Gandia, 90 F.3d at 616 n.9 (citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S.
1 (1989)).
100
Reopell, 936 F.2d at 16 (citing Union Gas, 491 U.S. 1).
101
160 F.3d 389 (7th Cir. 1998).
102
See 160 F.3d at 392; accord Palmatier v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 981 F. Supp.
529, 532 (W.D. Mich. 1997). The court also rejected the plaintiff’s argument that
USERRA’s abrogation was based on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment—
concluding that the “only constitutional basis of USERRA is . . . the war power”—and
refused to consider whether due process abrogation was applicable. Velasquez, 160
F.3d at 391-92.
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103

sufficient to abrogate state immunity.
Although that chronological distinction is not particularly
104
convincing, it has support under Seminole Tribe, where the Court
distinguished its approval of Fourteenth Amendment abrogation,
stating that “the Fourteenth Amendment, adopted well after the
adoption of the Eleventh Amendment and the ratification of the
Constitution, operated to alter the pre-existing balance between state
and federal power achieved by Article III and the Eleventh
105
Amendment.” The Velasquez court’s reliance on that statement was
soon undermined, however, for the Court shortly thereafter
abandoned its emphasis on chronology.
C. Alden v. Maine: A Historical Basis for State Immunity
Prior to Seminole Tribe, few courts were concerned with an
employee’s ability to pursue a federal lawsuit against a state employer
in state court because such an option had generally been considered
106
107
available.
In Alden v. Maine, the Supreme Court eliminated that
option.
The plaintiffs in Alden had filed a FLSA suit in federal court
108
After the Supreme
against their employer, the State of Maine.
Court subsequently decided Seminole Tribe, the district court dismissed
109
the Alden suit. The plaintiffs then filed their claims in state court,
which were dismissed based on the state’s argument that it had
110
immunity against private suits in its own courts.
In rejecting the validity of Congress’s clear abrogation of state
immunity in the FLSA, the Court, in an opinion better left for others
111
to criticize, held that “the powers delegated to Congress under

103

See id. at 391.
See supra note 30.
105
517 U.S. at 65-66.
106
See, e.g., Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 394; Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 210
(6th Cir. 1996).
107
527 U.S. 706 (1999).
108
See id. at 711-12.
109
See id. at 712.
110
See id.
111
See, e.g., id. at 760 (Souter, J., dissenting); Joan Meyler, A Matter of
Misinterpretation, State Sovereign Immunity, and Eleventh Amendment Jurisprudence: The
Supreme Court’s Reformation of the Constitution in Seminole Tribe and Its Progeny, 45
HOW. L.J. 77, 141-48 (2001) (arguing that the Founders’ intent under the
Constitution was to permit Congress to authorize federal court jurisdiction over most
private suits against states); see also John J. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State
Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 1895-1914 (1983)
(arguing that the historical evidence shows that the states never thought they
104
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Article I . . . do not include the power to subject nonconsenting
112
States to private suits for damages in state courts.”
The Court
emphasized that state sovereign immunity is not derived from the
Eleventh Amendment; rather, it “is a fundamental aspect of the
sovereignty which the States enjoyed before the ratification of the
Constitution, and which they retain today . . . except as altered by the
113
plan of the Convention or certain constitutional Amendments.”
114
The Eleventh Amendment merely confirmed that immunity.
Accordingly, states will possess immunity in a given area unless
there is “‘compelling evidence’ that the states were required to
surrender [their immunity] to Congress pursuant to the
115
constitutional design.” The Alden Court concluded that neither the
116
Supremacy Clause, nor Congress’s “specific Article I powers,”
provided compelling evidence that the constitutional design
permitted Congress to require a state to entertain a case against it in
117
its own courts.
The Court found that such evidence was also
lacking in the “history, practice, precedent, and the structure of the
118
Constitution,” and concluded that “the States retain immunity from
private suits in their own courts, an immunity beyond the
119
congressional power to abrogate by Article I legislation.”
Although the Court’s sweeping statement that Congress cannot
abrogate under Article I is an obstacle to war powers abrogation,

possessed sovereignty against private suits during either the colonial period or the
constitutional ratification); John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to Create
Causes of Action Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and Fourteenth
Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413, 1425-30 (1975) (concluding that the
Constitution intended for Congress to have the power to provide federal court
jurisdiction in most suits against a state by citizens of another state).
112
Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
113
Id. at 713.
114
See id. at 713, 728-29.
115
Id. at 731 (quoting Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak & Circle Vill., 501 U.S.
775, 781 (1991)); see also Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68 (“There is also the postulate
that States of the Union, still possessing attributes of sovereignty, shall be immune
from suits, without their consent, save where there has been a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention.”) (quoting Principality of Monaco v.
Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 323 (1934) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
116
“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.” U.S. CONST. art. VI.
117
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 731-34.
118
Id. at 741, 754; see also Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S.
743, 753-54 (2002) (looking to original understanding of Constitution and early
congressional practice).
119
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 741, 754.
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Alden actually justifies the validity of USERRA’s application to state
employers. By shifting the analysis away from Seminole Tribe’s reliance
on chronology and toward states’ historical immunity, Alden implicitly
recognized that the history of the federal government’s war powers
may constitute an exception to the general prohibition against Article
120
I abrogation.
In short, even if the plan of the Constitutional
Convention did not intend for Congress to abrogate state immunity
under all of its Article I powers, it is inconceivable that the
Constitution—given its primary goal of establishing a central power
over the new nation’s external relations, particularly its military
121
abilities —was intended to permit states to thwart the new federal
war powers by invoking sovereign immunity.
D. War Powers Abrogation After Alden
Alden’s move away from a chronological analysis, and toward an
emphasis on the history of the Constitution, provides an important
basis for holding that USERRA’s war powers abrogation is valid. To
be sure, it is far from clear whether the current Court would hold
that USERRA is an exception to its dicta prohibiting all Article I
abrogation. Yet, the extraordinary difference between Congress’s war
122
powers and most of its other Article I powers suggests that, under
the plan of the Constitution, the states did not retain immunity—if
they ever had it—where the federal government acts to further the
nation’s military efforts.
The Court has relied on often confusing evidence from English
common law, the Constitutional Convention, and the state ratifying
conventions to hold that Congress lacks the general power under
120

See Althouse, supra note 30, at 644 n.62 (raising the possibility that Alden
changes the basis for Velasquez); Major Hehr & Major Wallace, The Supreme Court
“Outfoxes” the Ninth Circuit, 1999 ARMY LAW. 47, 53 n.97 (1999) (suggesting that
Congress’s war power abrogation in USERRA may provide an exception to Seminole
Tribe); cf. Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp., 319 F.3d 755, 762-67 (6th Cir.),
cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 45 (2003) (holding that abrogation under the Bankruptcy Act
was valid because the grant of power to Congress to make “uniform” laws in
bankruptcy represented a design in the plan of the Constitution to allow abrogation
where Congress exercises that power); Bandes, supra note 69, at 747-48 (arguing that
abrogation under Congress’s treaty power may be valid after Alden). But see Vazquez,
Treaties, supra note 69, at 726 (suggesting that war powers abrogation is invalid).
121
See infra note 140 and accompanying text.
122
As noted below, the federal government’s foreign powers in general may
constitute an exception. See infra notes 131-37 and accompanying text. Those
foreign powers may be part of what the Court referred to in Alden, where it held that
the limits on federal supervision of the states do not apply “‘to matters [that] the
Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United States.’” Alden, 527
U.S. at 754 (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938)).
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123

Article I to abrogate state immunity.
Rather than reexamine that
history, this Article accepts the Court’s historical interpretation and
argues that its own holdings, including its principal historical
reference, support the validity of war powers abrogation.
As oft-quoted by the Court, Alexander Hamilton stated in The
Federalist No. 81 that “[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not
to be amenable to the suit of an individual without its consent. . . .
Unless, therefore, there is a surrender of this immunity in the plan of
124
the convention, it will remain with the [s]tates . . . .” The very next
sentence, although consistently absent from the Court’s majority
opinions, declares that “[t]he circumstances which are necessary to
produce an alienation of state sovereignty, were discussed in
125
considering the article of taxation, and need not be repeated here.”
That discussion is found in The Federalist No. 32, where Hamilton
stated:
[A]s the plan of the convention aims only at a partial union or
consolidation, the state governments would clearly retain all the
rights of sovereignty which they before had, and which were not,
by that act, exclusively delegated to the United States. This
exclusive delegation, or rather this alienation of state sovereignty,
would only exist in three cases: where the constitution in express
terms granted an exclusive authority to the union; where it
granted, in one instance, an authority to the union, and in
another, prohibited the states from exercising the like authority;
and where it granted an authority to the union, to which a similar
authority in the states would be absolutely and totally contradictory
126
and repugnant.

123

See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 714-57; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 68-71.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 487-88 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961), quoted in Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 752
(2002); Alden, 527 U.S. at 716-17; Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v.
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 634 (1999); Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54, 70 n.13; Hans
v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 13 (1890); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 773 & n.13 (Souter, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Hamilton was stating the unique view that state immunity
derived from natural, rather than common, law, and that he was referring only to
immunity “with respect to diversity cases applying state contract law”). Justice
Souter’s dissent in Alden also noted the state ratification conventions’ disparate views
on state immunity to argue that the majority’s historical analysis is not as certain as it
claims. See Alden, 527 U.S. at 775-81, 792 (Souter, J., dissenting).
125
THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 488 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 145-46 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting
“difficulties that accrue to the majority from reliance on The Federalist No. 81”).
126
THE FEDERALIST NO. 32, at 198 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance Corp., 319 F.3d 755, 766 (6th Cir.),
cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 45 (2003) (holding that bankruptcy abrogation falls under
Hamilton’s “alienation” examples).
124
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The federal government’s war powers satisfy all three of
Hamilton’s “alienations.” First, the federal government’s war powers
are exclusive under two views: that the states never possessed such
powers; or that the states allocated, through the Articles of
Confederation and the Constitution, whatever colonial-era war
127
powers they may have possessed to the federal government.
Indeed, Hamilton’s own belief was that the federal government’s war
128
powers “ought to exist without limitation.” Second, the text of the
Constitution explicitly grants war powers authority to the federal
129
government, while prohibiting state power in the same area. Third,
it is difficult to imagine any federal authority to which a similar

127

See infra notes 131-56 and accompanying text; see also ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION art. 6 (“No state shall engage in any war” without federal consent
except for an invasion or emergency Indian attack.); id. art. 9 (“Congress possesses
the sole and exclusive right and power of determining on peace and war.”); Jack L.
Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA. L. REV. 1617, 1714
(1997) (stating that in “traditional foreign relations contexts, federal exclusivity is
effectively assured by Article I, Section 10 and by extant federal enactments”); Peter
J. Spiro, Foreign Relations Federalism, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1223, 1228-29 (1999)
(“[A]gainst the landscape of foreign relations as they were conducted at the time of
the Founding, the allocation [of foreign power in the Constitution] seems decisively
to have established a principle of federal exclusivity.”); John C. Yoo, The Continuation
of Politics by Other Means: The Original Understanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167,
182 (1996) (noting, in discussion of separation of federal war powers, thenCongressman and eventually Chief Justice Marshall’s statement that the President
was “the sole organ of the nation in its external relations”) (quoting 10 ANNALS OF
CONG. 613 (1800)); id. at 236-37 (“The drafters of the Articles vested all war powers
in the Continental Congress.”). See generally Charles A. Lofgren, United States v.
Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 16-18
(1973) (describing theory that states vested foreign affairs authority to the federal
government in the Constitutional Convention). But see Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers
Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of
Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 280 (2002) (“[T]he Rehnquist
Court’s increasingly restrictive approach to national authority in the domestic sphere
raises interesting questions regarding the extent to which the Court will continue to
authorize expansive national authority over foreign relations.”).
128
THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 153 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961); see also Yoo, supra note 127, at 272 (quoting antifederalists’ concession during
ratification debate that the federal government had exclusive power of “all foreign
concerns, causes arising on the seas, to commerce, imports, armies, navies, Indian
affairs, peace and war,” and James Madison’s statement in THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at
292-93 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961): “The powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which
are to remain in the State governments are numerous and infinite. The former will
be exercised principally on external objects, as war, peace, negotiation, and foreign
commerce . . . .”).
129
See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text; see also Goldsmith, supra note
127, at 1619-20 (emphasizing that the foreign power provisions of the Constitution
“give the federal political branches comprehensive power to conduct foreign
relations without interference of limitation by the states”).
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authority granted to individual states would be more “contradictory
and repugnant.” Thus, as the Seventh Circuit held in a pre-Seminole
Tribe case, Congress’s abrogation of state immunity in USERRA was
“an exercise of power delegated to it ‘in the plan of the convention,’
which includes the power to make the states amenable to damage
130
actions in federal courts.”
The argument that the Constitution expressly granted the
federal government exclusive authority over war powers is bolstered
by well-established Supreme Court precedent holding that the states,
even prior to the Articles of Confederation or Constitution, never
131
possessed such powers. In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp.,
for example, the Court explicitly held that the states never possessed
authority to engage in foreign relations, including acts of war.
Curtiss-Wright involved convictions under a presidential
proclamation and congressional joint resolution prohibiting arms
132
sales to Bolivia.
One of the defendants’ arguments was that the
joint resolution invalidly delegated congressional powers to the
President by allowing him to decide whether to make arms sales
133
illegal.
The Court rejected that defense. Assuming that the resolution
would normally constitute an invalid delegation of lawmaking
authority, the Court asked whether an exception was warranted
because the resolution involved a unique class of government
conduct—one that is “entirely external to the United States, and
134
falling within the category of foreign affairs.”
In addressing that
question, the Court made clear that the federal government’s foreign
135
powers were fundamentally different from its domestic powers vis-àvis the states:
The broad statement that the federal government can exercise no
powers except those specifically enumerated in the Constitution,
and such implied powers as are necessary and proper to carry into
effect the enumerated powers, is categorically true only in respect
of our internal affairs. In that field, the primary purpose of the
Constitution was to carve from the general mass of legislative
powers then possessed by the states such portions as it was thought
130

Jennings v. Ill. Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935, 942 (7th Cir. 1979).
299 U.S. 304 (1936).
132
Id. at 311.
133
Id. at 314.
134
Id. at 315.
135
Id. at 318 (noting foreign powers, including the “powers to declare and wage
war, to conclude peace, to make treaties, [and] to maintain diplomatic relations with
other sovereignties”).
131
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desirable to vest in the federal government, leaving those not
included in the enumeration still in the states. That this doctrine
applies only to powers which the states had is self evident. And
since the states severally never possessed international powers, such powers
could not have been carved from the mass of state powers but obviously
136
were transmitted to the United States from some other source.

The Court’s conclusion that states never possessed war powers is
significant. Although states may have generally retained their
sovereign immunity under the Constitution—even against express
federal abrogation—it is implausible that they expected to have
immunity where the federal government exercises powers that the
137
states never possessed.
136

Id. at 315-16 (emphasis added and internal citation omitted); see also Edward T.
Swaine, Negotiating Federalism: State Bargaining and the Dormant Treaty Power, 49 DUKE
L.J. 1127, 1203 n.275 (2000) (citing articles, and noting Rufus King’s statement at
the Constitutional Convention that “[t]he states were not ‘sovereigns’ in the sense
contended for by some. They did not possess the peculiar features of sovereignty.
They could not make war, nor peace, nor alliances, nor treaties”) (quoting 1 THE
RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 323 (Max Farrand ed., 1937)
(Madison’s notes)). The basis for Curtiss-Wright’s holding was that the federal
foreign affairs powers were “extra-constitutional” because the source of those powers
was Great Britain, whose sovereignty passed to the Union as a whole, not to the
individual states. See Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316, 318 (noting that, even if not
mentioned in the Constitution, the foreign powers “would have vested in the federal
government as necessary concomitants of nationality”).
137
The Court has emphasized federal exclusivity in other foreign powers cases,
particularly in holding that conflicting state actions were preempted by the federal
government’s exclusive power in that area. See Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 123 S.
Ct. 2374, 2378 (2003) (holding that state requirement that insurance companies
disclose information about Holocaust-era policies was preempted by a federal
executive order because the state law “compromises the President’s very capacity to
speak for the Nation with one voice in dealing with other governments”); Crosby v.
Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 374 n.8 (2002) (invalidating state
restrictions on trade with Burma because the “state Act presents a sufficient obstacle
to the full accomplishment of Congress’s objectives under the [related] federal Act
to find it preempted”); Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (invalidating
state law limiting nonresident alien claims to estate property because it “is an
intrusion by the State into the field of foreign affairs which the Constitution entrusts
to the President and the Congress”); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942)
(holding that state law must yield to decree negotiated by federal government and
foreign country because “[p]ower over external affairs is not shared by the States; it
is vested in the national government exclusively”); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,
63 (1941) (holding that state alien registration act was invalid because “[n]o state
can add to or take from the force and effect of [a] treaty . . . for [t]he Federal
Government . . . is entrusted with full and exclusive responsibility for the conduct of
affairs with foreign sovereignties”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331
(1937) (“[The] complete power over international affairs is in the national
government and is not and cannot be subject to any curtailment or interference on
the part of the several states. In respect of all international negotiations and
compacts, and in respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As
to such purposes the [s]tate . . . does not exist.”) (internal citation omitted); Missouri
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To be sure, as the Velasquez court noted, there is legitimate doubt
138
about the Court’s holding that states never possessed war powers.
Even if the Court overruled Curtiss-Wright, however, and found that
the colonial state governments had some military authority, the
Constitution’s exclusive delegation of war powers to the federal
government supports the “alienation” of state immunity where those
139
powers are exercised.
It appears beyond dispute that, in ratifying the Constitution, the

v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 434 (1920) (holding that federal migratory bird treaty did
not interfere with state’s Tenth Amendment rights because, although “the great body
of private relations usually fall within the control of the State, . . . a treaty may
override its power”); Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581, 629 (1889)
(declining jurisdiction over act that prohibited certain aliens from entering the
country because, in part, the federal political branches are “invested with power over
all foreign relations of the country, war, peace, and negotiations and intercourse with
other nations; all of which are forbidden to the state government”). See generally G.
Edward White, The Transformation of the Constitutional Regime of Foreign Relations, 85 VA.
L. REV. 1 (1999).
138
See Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 392-93 (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 316-18;
Goldsmith, supra note 127, at 1660 & n.184 (noting differing views on whether the
states ever possessed foreign relations powers); Lofgren, supra note 127, at 32); see
also Yoo, supra note 127, at 224-35 (discussing the war powers of pre-Articles of
Confederation state legislatures and governors). Moreover, scholars have questioned
whether the need to exclude states from foreign affairs is still wise in the post-Cold
War era. See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, A New American Foreign Affairs Law?, 70 U. COLO.
L. REV. 1089 (1999); G. Edward White, Observations on the Turning of Foreign Affairs
Jurisprudence, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1109 (1999). Finally, the Court’s reliance on the
federal government’s “extra-constitutional” source of foreign powers has been
criticized as well. See, e.g., Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 392-93 (citing articles); Lofgren,
supra note 127, at 32 (describing as “shockingly inaccurate” the Court’s holding that
the federal government’s foreign affairs powers came from an extra-constitutional
source); Swaine, supra note 136, at 1129-30 & n.1 (citing articles).
139
Velasquez noted also that even if it were true that the states’ sovereign powers
never included war powers, it does not follow that “they surrendered any part of their
sovereign immunity from a suit seeking money from the state treasury. That immunity is an
independent attribute of sovereignty rather than an incident of the war power or of
any other governmental power that a state might or might not have. The subject
matter of the suit to which the defense of sovereign immunity is interposed is thus
irrelevant.” Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 393 (internal citations omitted). Although
Velasquez’s stress on states’ general immunity from private suits, as opposed to the
subject matter of a given suit, is understandable given that Alden, Kimel, Garrett, and
Hibbs had yet to be decided, see supra note 69 and accompanying text, its statement
proves far too much. Taken literally, Velasquez would dispense with Fourteenth
Amendment abrogation as well, for nowhere in the Fourteenth Amendment is there
an indication that states were surrendering their immunity. See Nowak, supra note
111, at 1458 (“There is no discussion in the debates of the ability of federal courts to
entertain damage actions against state governments under the [F]ourteenth
[A]mendment without congressional authorization.”). Rather, as the Supreme
Court has held, by limiting state actions and giving Congress enforcement power, the
states implicitly surrendered their immunity under the Fourteenth Amendment. See
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59; Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 455 (1976).

2004

WAR POWERS

1027

states transferred whatever war powers they may have possessed to the
federal government. As one commentator has noted, “[o]ne of the
primary and least controversial purposes of the Constitutional
Convention was to strengthen the foreign relations powers of the
140
federal government vis-à-vis the states.”
Yet, that intent is not
dispositive; under current law, the federal government’s exclusive
authority in an area does not, by itself, permit abrogation of states’
141
immunity.
The transfer of war powers was remarkable, however, as the
Constitution explicitly granted powers to the federal government,
while barring state action absent express federal approval. Thus, the
Constitution not only delegated exclusive war powers authority to the
federal government, but also, in the words of Hamilton, “prohibited
142
the states from exercising the like authority.”
Indeed, the war
powers’ “alienation” of state immunity was confirmed by a relatively
contemporary Supreme Court holding in 1824, when Chief Justice
Marshall wrote that “[t]he powers of the Union, on the great subjects
of war, peace, and commerce, and on many others, are in themselves
143
limitations of the sovereignty of the States.” In short, by carving out
state authority and delegating it to the federal government, the
140

Goldsmith, supra note 127, at 1643; see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 777 n.16 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (“[O]ne of the main reasons a Constitutional Convention was
necessary at all was that under the Articles of Confederation Congress lacked the
effective capacity to bind the States.”); W. TAYLOR REVELEY III, WAR POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS: WHO HOLDS THE ARROWS AND THE OLIVE BRANCH? 64-65
(1981) (arguing, with respect to allocation of power between the President and
Congress, that the Framers intended “Congress . . . to control most American
decisions about war and peace,” but recognized the need for a “single command”
while at war); Lofgren, supra note 127, at 16-17 (noting John Jay’s statement that the
states had vested Congress with war powers “‘by express delegation of power’”)
(citing 31 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 797-98 (1934) (Oct. 13, 1786)).
141
See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72.
142
See supra note 126 and accompanying text; see also Peel v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp.,
600 F.2d 1070, 1081 (5th Cir. 1979) (holding, pre-Seminole Tribe, that USERRA’s
abrogation was valid because “‘[t]he war power of the federal government is its
supreme power. When it is in action it is transcendent’”) (quoting St. Johns River
Shipbuilding Co. v. Adams, 164 F.2d 1012, 1015 (5th Cir. 1947)); Jennings v. Ill.
Office of Educ., 589 F.2d 935, 938 (7th Cir. 1979) (holding, pre-Seminole Tribe, that
USERRA’s abrogation was valid because “Congress was ‘exercising legislative
authority that is plenary within the terms of the Constitutional (war powers) grant’”)
(quoting Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 456).
143
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 382 (1821) (holding that the Court
had jurisdiction over the state in an appeal from a state law conviction, where
defendant used a federal act as a defense). Obviously, the present Court has not
followed Cohens in its interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment. See Seminole Tribe,
517 U.S. at 96 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that Cohens held that the Eleventh
Amendment’s intent was to limit federal jurisdiction over private suits seeking
payment of state debts).
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Constitution fundamentally changed the balance of state and federal
war powers, echoing the change that would later occur under the
144
Fourteenth Amendment.
By its terms, therefore, the Constitution
reveals that with regard to war powers, “there [was] a surrender . . . of
145
immunity in the plan of the convention.”
The text of the Constitution plainly grants broad federal control
over military affairs. Under Article II, the President is “Commander
in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia
of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United
146
States.”
Moreover, Congress has the power under Article I to
147
“provide for the common Defence,” to “declare War, grant Letters
of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
148
149
Land and Water,” to “raise and support Armies,” to “provide and
150
to “make Rules for the Government and
maintain a Navy,”
151
Regulation of the land and naval Forces,” to “provide for calling
forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress
152
Insurrections and repel Invasions,” and to “provide for organizing,
arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of
them as may be employed in the Service of the United States,
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers,
and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline

144

See Jennings, 589 F.2d at 938, 941-42; see also Hood v. Tenn. Student Assistance
Corp., 319 F.3d 755, 765 (6th Cir.), cert. granted, 124 S. Ct. 45 (2003) (recognizing,
but ultimately rejecting, the theoretical plausibility of the argument that “in ceding
some sovereignty with the Bankruptcy Clause, the states ceded their legislative
powers but not their immunity from suit”). Indeed, the Supreme Court has long
rejected attempts by states to hinder federal exercise of war powers by, for example,
refusing to permit state militia members from participating in federal military
exercises. See, e.g., Perpich v. Dep’t of Def., 496 U.S. 334, 351 (1990) (rejecting State
of Minnesota’s attempt to prevent state National Guard members from participating
in federal military training in Honduras because the militia clauses “recognize[] the
supremacy of federal power in the area of military affairs” and “several constitutional
provisions commit matters of foreign policy and military affairs to the exclusive
control of the National Government”); Martin v. Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19 (1827)
(holding that state militia member could not refuse federal military service in the
War of 1812).
145
Alden, 527 U.S. at 717 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 488 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
146
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
147
Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 1.
148
Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 11.
149
Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 12.
150
Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 13.
151
Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 14.
152
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15.
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153

prescribed by Congress.”
As noted, Article I provides not only
154
positive federal war powers, but also expressly limits the states’ war
155
powers: they are unable to “grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal,”
and “[n]o State shall, without the Consent of Congress, . . . keep
Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, . . . or engage in War,
unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit
156
of delay.”
Those war powers are striking in their expansive grant of power
to the federal government and their express limitations on state
power, which can generally be exercised only with Congress’s
approval. Indeed, that subordination of state power, although
lacking an explicit enforcement clause, mirrors the Fourteenth
Amendment’s allocation of authority between the federal and state
governments.
In Alden, the Court reemphasized the validity of Fourteenth
Amendment abrogation in terms that apply equally well to federal
war powers, while also invoking Hamilton’s alienations: “By imposing
explicit limits on the powers of the States and granting Congress the
power to enforce them, the Amendment ‘fundamentally altered the
157
balance of state and federal power . . . .’”
Accordingly, like the
153

Id., art. I, § 8, cl. 16.
See Spiro, supra note 127, at 1228 (“The constitutional architecture itself
evinces a norm of federal exclusivity in foreign affairs, on the one hand granting
expansive foreign relations power to the federal government, on the other denying
them to the states.”); John C. Yoo, Clio at War: The Misuse of History in the War Powers
Debate, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1169, 1176 (1999) (“What the Constitution gives to the
[federal] political branches, it explicitly takes from the states.”).
155
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 1.
156
Id., art. I, § 10, cl. 3; see also W. Taylor Reveley III, War Powers, 83 COLUM. L.
REV. 2117, 2121 (1983) (reviewing EDWARD KEYNES, UNDECLARED WAR: TWILIGHT
ZONE OF CONSTITUTIONAL POWER (1982)) (stating that section 10, clause 3 “suggests
that the Framers expected the states to bear the major burden of defense against
sudden attack until Congress could act”).
157
Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 (quoting Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59); see also Jennings,
589 F.2d at 938, 941-42 (equating, in pre-Seminole Tribe case, USERRA’s war power
abrogation to abrogation pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment); cf. McVey
Trucking, Inc. v. Sec’y of St. of Ill., 812 F.2d 311, 320-21 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding,
pre-Seminole Tribe, that Congress may abrogate state immunity under its bankruptcy
powers, and rejecting theory that Fitzpatrick tied Fourteenth Amendment abrogation
to explicit limits on state power because Congress’s “plenary” power necessarily limits
state authority). Fitzpatrick, however, also noted that the Fourteenth Amendment
“[i]mpressed upon [the states] . . . duties with respect to their treatment of private
individuals.” Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 453. Although the war powers lack that nexus to
private individuals, Fitzpatrick also recognized that “‘every addition of power to the
general government involves a corresponding diminution of governmental powers of
the States. It is carved out of them.’” Fitzpatrick, 427 U.S. at 455 (quoting Ex parte
Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 347 (1880)). So too did the Constitution transfer whatever
154
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federal government’s exercise of its war powers, “[w]hen Congress
enacts appropriate legislation to enforce [the Fourteenth
Amendment], federal interests are paramount, and Congress may
assert an authority over the States which would be otherwise
158
unauthorized by the Constitution.”
The Constitution’s exclusive grant of war powers to the federal
government, at the expense of state authority, also reflects the
enormous importance of having a unified military policy. As
Hamilton recognized, to sufficiently exercise its war powers, the
federal government must be able to prevent recalcitrant states from
thwarting federal action through invocations of sovereign
159
immunity. The Supreme Court, in another opinion by Chief Justice
Marshall, affirmed the understanding that state war powers would be
“contradictory and repugnant” to the exclusive federal war powers by
holding that, under the Constitution, “the powers of sovereignty are
war powers the states possessed to the federal government. See Yoo, supra note 127,
at 254-56.
158
Alden, 527 U.S. at 756 (internal citations omitted); see also Case v. Bowles, 327
U.S. 92, 102 (1946) (permitting Office of Price Administration to enjoin state timber
sale because to hold otherwise would make “the Constitutional grant of the power to
make war . . . inadequate to accomplish its full purpose. And this result would impair
a prime purpose of the federal government’s establishment”); Goldsmith, supra note
127, at 1645 (arguing that the Constitution “ensured state compliance with the
political branches’ foreign relations enactments. But they left the determination of
when the national foreign relations interest would be best served by the exclusion of
state power largely to the discretion of the federal political branches”); Major
Richard M. Lattimer, Jr., Myopic Federalism: The Public Trust Doctrine and Regulation of
Military Activities, 150 MIL. L. REV. 79, 132-33 (1995) (arguing for negative war powers
theory to prevent state regulation of military activities).
159
See Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 549 (1985)
(holding that Congress could impose minimum wage and overtime restrictions on
states because they do not retain sovereign authority where the Constitution
“divested them of their original powers and transferred those powers to the Federal
Government,” and specifically noting the Article I, section 8 powers of Congress, and
Article I, section 10 restrictions on state power); Case, 327 U.S. at 102 (“To construe
the Constitution as preventing [the federal government from regulating state land
sales pursuant to its war powers] would be to read it as a self-defeating charter. . . .
[T]he Tenth Amendment does not operate as a limitation upon the powers, express
or implied, delegated to the national government.”) (internal quotation marks
omitted); Cantwell v. County of San Mateo, 631 F.2d 631, 636 (9th Cir. 1980)
(holding that Congress did not violate the Tenth Amendment where VRRA
conflicted with state statutes because the war powers are distinguishable from the
commerce powers); Jennings, 589 F.2d at 938 (“[T]he power given to Congress to
prosecute war ‘is not destroyed or impaired by any provision of the Constitution or
by any one of the amendments.’”) (quoting Lichter v. United States, 334 U.S. 742,
781 (1948)); Goldsmith, supra note 127, at 1670 (“[T]he functional case for a selfexecuting prohibition [through federal common law] on subnational foreign
relations activity is strongest under [the] traditional concept[]” of foreign relations,
such as military issues).

2004

WAR POWERS

1031

divided between the government of the Union, and those of the
States. They are each sovereign, with respect to the objects
committed to it, and neither sovereign with respect to the objects
160
committed to the other.”
Although the current Court, for the most part, has moved away
from Marshall’s view of sovereignty, the importance of federal war
powers should prove an exception. The Court’s recent state
abrogation holdings have centered on a concern that a “general
federal power to authorize private suits for money damages would
place unwarranted strain on the States’ ability to govern in
161
accordance with the will of their citizens.” That concern, however,
should not prevent the Court from acknowledging that the Founders
and ratifying states did not contemplate the ability of states to
undermine a uniform national defense and war policy by invoking
162
sovereign immunity; the Constitution is not a “suicide pact.”
Despite its minor infringement on states’ freedom to allocate
resources, USERRA’s abrogation is not a disproportionate attempt to
address a trivial objective. Rather, it narrowly targets state actions
that directly impede the nation’s growing need to recruit and retain
soldiers. A low-level state manager, for example, may decide that
compliance with USERRA, particularly where significant numbers of
163
employees are called away for unforeseeable periods of time, is too
costly. Absent abrogation, that individual’s narrow self-interest can
ignore the broader concerns of the nation as a whole—even when

160

M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 410 (1819), quoted in Alden,
527 U.S. at 800 (Souter, J., dissenting); see also Alden, 527 U.S. at 754 (“‘Supervision
over either the legislative or the judicial action of the States is in no case permissible
except as to matters by the Constitution specifically authorized or delegated to the United
States.’”) (emphasis added) (quoting Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-79
(1938)).
161
Alden, 527 U.S. at 750-51 (emphasis added).
162
See Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 159 (1963) (invalidating
statute that divested citizenship of person who left country to avoid the draft, while
recognizing that the “powers of Congress to require military service for the common
defense are broad and far-reaching, for while the Constitution protects against
invasions of individual rights, it is not a suicide pact”); see also Case, 327 U.S. at 102;
Schell v. Ohio State Highway Patrol, No. C-2-80-641, 1981 WL 2289, at *2-*3 (S.D.
Ohio June 1, 1981) (holding, in pre-Seminole Tribe case, that the state employer had
no Eleventh Amendment immunity from VRRA suit because “the responsibility of
the national government to raise and support the military places the national
government in a special position vis-à-vis the states,” therefore, “[d]ifferent policy
considerations are raised by the Commerce and the War Powers Clauses . . . [and]
our system of federalism requires greater deference to federal interests where the
War Powers are involved”).
163
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text.

1032

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:999
164

those concerns involve areas as serious as military action.
It is in
such instances where the need for federal action is paramount and
165
should trump individual states’ sovereignty interests.
In sum, although the Court’s explicit balancing of interests has
consistently favored state immunity concerns over private
enforcement of federal rights, Congress’s enactment of USERRA
represents the apex of federal authority. Accordingly, that statute’s
war powers abrogation provides the best case for the Court to
recognize a limited exception to its general disapproval of Article I
abrogation.
To be sure, when reviewing its statements that Congress cannot
abrogate state immunity pursuant to Article I, the Court could hold
166
that it meant what it said. Indeed, one fears, especially with regard
167
to state sovereign immunity, that by merely repeating the Article I
168
dicta enough, the Court will turn it into unassailable law.
Such a
164

See, e.g., Wriggelsworth v. Brumbaugh, 129 F. Supp. 2d. 1106, 1112 (W.D. Mich.
2001) (holding that state statute and pension plan at issue were preempted by 38
U.S.C. § 4302 (2000), which provides uniform set of rights by expressly preempting
any state law, collective-bargaining agreement, or certain other plans that limit
USERRA’s protections); Meyler, supra note 111, at 104 (arguing that Congress,
pursuant to War Powers and the Necessary and Proper clauses of the Constitution,
should be able to require state employers to maintain hypothetical draftees’
employment seniority).
165
See Althouse, supra note 30, at 644 n.62 (“There is little, if any, recognizable
normative value to the states’ ability to produce diverse [war powers] solutions
tailored to local needs and preferences, as there is with the commerce power.”);
Goldsmith, supra note 127, at 1677 (stating that traditional foreign relations matters,
like military affairs, differ from nontraditional foreign relations matters in that
federal-state concurrent authority over the latter is “much less likely to undermine
the United States’ ability to participate in international affairs, and much less likely
to harm the national foreign relations interest”); see also Akhil Reed Amar, Of
Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1495-1500 (1987) (discussing states’
check on the federal government’s military power through their ability to train
militias under Congress’s prescriptions).
166
See supra note 94 and accompanying text.
167
See, e.g., Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 54 (refusing to follow literal text of Eleventh
Amendment because of its past holdings in, for example, Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S.
1 (1890), which held, in spite of the text of the amendment, that Eleventh
Amendment prohibits federal jurisdiction over a private suit against a citizen’s own
nonconsenting state).
168
The Court may be reversing course, however, as evidenced by its recent
decision in Nevada Department of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 123 S. Ct. 1972 (2003). See
supra notes 60-68 and accompanying text. In restating Seminole Tribe’s abrogation
rule, the Court in Hibbs moved away from its practice of declaring that Congress
cannot abrogate under any of its Article I powers, see supra note 94, to the subtly—
although perhaps significantly—different statement that “Congress may not abrogate
the States’ sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I power over commerce.” 123 S.
Ct. at 1977 (emphasis added). Although it is too soon to tell whether that change
portends a meaningful distinction, Hibbs supports the view that the Court will
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holding, however, would require a shift away from Fitzpatrick and
Alden, as well as an explanation why, under the plan of the
Constitution, states expected to possess immunity against the federal
government’s exercise of its extraordinarily broad war powers. The
Court is unlikely to put itself in that quandary, for even where it has
expanded state immunity, it has been careful not to encroach upon
the federal government’s war powers. For example, although the
169
Court held in National League of Cities v. Usery that Congress could
not apply the FLSA to “core” state activities, it specifically noted that
170
it was not overruling the holding of Case v. Bowles —that Congress
could enjoin state sales of timber under federal wartime price rules—
because “[n]othing we say in [Usery] addresses the scope of Congress’
171
authority under its war power.”
172
One could argue, as did the Seventh Circuit in Velasquez, that
striking down USERRA’s abrogation would have little impact because
173
relief against state employers is available under Ex parte Young suits,
174
and in actions pursued by the federal government.
As discussed
recognize that its previous statements regarding Article I abrogation were too broad.
169
Nat’l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
170
Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92, 102 (1946).
171
Usery, 426 U.S. at 854 n.18; accord Cantwell v. County of San Mateo, 631 F.2d
631, 636 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that USERRA’s abrogation did not violate states’
Tenth Amendment powers); Peel v. Fla. Dep’t of Transp., 600 F.2d 1070, 1083-84
(5th Cir. 1979) (same). Also, a question asked during oral argument by Chief Justice
Rehnquist in 1996 may indicate his openness to the idea that congressional authority
over the states is greater during war than peace. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898 (1997) (holding that Congress’s attempt to make state officers carry out federal
handgun purchase law violated the Tenth Amendment), Transcript of Oral
Argument, 1996 WL 706933, at *39-*40 (Rehnquist, C.J., responding to Solicitor
General’s argument that Congress had the power to make states assist in World War I
effort by stating that “you would say there is some difference between wartime and
peacetime as to congressional authority”).
172
See Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 394.
173
See infra notes 184-90 and accompanying text.
174
See West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 311 n.4 (1987). Velasquez also
noted private parties’ ability to file an USERRA claim in state court—an alternative
subsequently eliminated by Alden. Moreover, in arguing that the need for war
powers abrogation was not grave, the Velasquez court stated that because National
Guards generally act as a state militia, the states have a substantial interest in
protecting them. See Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 394. It is not clear, however, that
individual judgments whether to protect a military employee’s job, or whether to
invoke sovereign immunity, will take into account the general benefit of the National
Guard. Indeed, that states have been not infrequently sued for such violations belies
the value that they place on such protections. Cf. Vazquez, Treaties, supra note 69, at
741 & n.112 (noting that the Founders believed that “states could not be trusted to
comply with their federal obligations without compulsion”) (citing THE FEDERALIST
NO. 15, at 149 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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below, however, those alternatives, as well as actions under state law,
do not sufficiently protect USERRA’s goals.
III. ALTERNATIVES TO ENSURING STATE COMPLIANCE WITH USERRA
One of the many points of contention between the majority and
dissent in Seminole Tribe was the degree to which alternate means of
175
enforcing federal rights would exist after the decision.
That
disagreement continued to play out in the Court’s subsequent
holdings, where it repeatedly limited federal statutes’ application to
176
the states.
According to the majority, the remaining enforcement
alternatives sufficiently protected federal rights, thereby allowing it to
conclude that the “principle of sovereign immunity as reflected in
our jurisprudence strikes the proper balance between the supremacy
177
of federal law and the separate sovereignty of the States.”
The efficacy of alternate means to enforce USERRA is
important, therefore, for those alternatives may be an implicit, if not
explicit, factor in the Court’s examination of war powers abrogation.
The Court will have to acknowledge that the need for a unified,
national war policy is directly related to the ability of military
employees to exercise their rights under USERRA; thus, it is likely to
question whether sufficient alternative remedies exist should war
powers abrogation be invalidated. As shown below, the answer to that
inquiry is that there are few, if any, suitable alternatives. In
particular, it appears that the equitable federal remedy generally
available for most other statutes is not permitted under USERRA, and
the alternatives that do exist fail adequately to protect the important
policy needs underlying USERRA.
A. Exceptions to State Sovereign Immunity
1.

Federal Suit Against a State Employer

Even where a private individual is not permitted to sue a state for
damages, it is well settled that states have no immunity against an
action brought on the individual’s behalf by the federal

175

See Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 77 n.1 (1996) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that exclusively federal schemes such as copyright and
bankruptcy will lack any remedy under the majority decision); id. at 72 n.16
(responding to Justice Stevens by noting alternative remedies, including Ex parte
Young actions).
176
See supra notes 35-59 and accompanying text.
177
Alden, 527 U.S. at 757.
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178

government.
USERRA explicitly allows for such an option, as
individuals may ask the United States Secretary of Labor to seek
179
enforcement against the state.
This option provides little more than false hope, however.
Although the federal government may become involved in
180
particularly significant cases, it lacks the resources to represent the
vast majority of employees seeking to enforce their federal
employment rights against a state employer, especially when war both
strains the federal budget and increases the number of soldiers being
181
called to active duty.
USERRA’s statutory scheme, moreover,
reflects Congress’s decision to encourage private enforcement of the
182
Accordingly, relying solely on potential federal enforcement
Act.
not only undermines USERRA’s intent, but provides little hope for
most military employees seeking monetary damages from a
178

See id. at 755-76; West Virginia v. United States, 479 U.S. 305, 312 n.4 (“States
retain no sovereign immunity as against the Federal Government.”); United States v.
Mississippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140 (1965); United States v. Miss. Dep’t of Pub. Safety, 321
F.3d 495 (5th Cir. 2003) (reversing district court’s grant of the state’s motion seeking
dismissal under the Eleventh Amendment of ADA suit brought by federal
government); Wilson-Jones v. Caviness, 99 F.3d 203, 211 (6th Cir. 1996) (noting that
29 U.S.C. § 216 allows the Labor Department to bring FLSA suits on behalf of
individuals).
179
See 38 U.S.C. §§ 4322(a)(2)(B), 4323, 4326 (2000); Klein & Cilenti, supra note
74, at 17. The Attorney General, however, must approve such suits. See 38 U.S.C. §§
4322, 4323.
180
For example, after the Supreme Court, citing Seminole Tribe, vacated a Ninth
Circuit decision allowing a class action ADEA suit against the California Public
Employees Retirement System, the EEOC intervened and ultimately secured a $250
million settlement. See Joyce E. Cutler, Nation’s Largest Pension Plan to Pay $250
Million to Settle Age Bias Charges, 21 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at A-9 to A-10 (Jan. 31,
2003); see also Cal. Pub. Employees’ Ret. Sys. v. Arnett, 528 U.S. 1111 (2000), vacating 179
F.3d 690 (9th Cir. 1999), remanded to No. 95-03022 CRB (N.D. Cal. Jan. 29, 2003)
(approving settlement).
181
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 810 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“[U]nless Congress plans a
significant expansion of the National Government’s litigating forces to provide a
lawyer whenever private litigation is barred by today’s decision and Seminole Tribe, the
allusion to enforcement of private rights by the National Government is probably not
much more than whimsy.”); Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 704 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Congress . . . might
create a federal damages-collecting ‘enforcement’ bureaucracy charged with
responsibilities that Congress would prefer to place in the hands of States or private
citizens.”); BRIAN LANDSBERG, ENFORCING CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE DISCRIMINATION AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 211 n.1 (1997) (discussing the limited resources of the
Justice Department’s Office of Civil Rights, and noting that “[m]ost federal law
enforcement is given limited resources, perhaps because Congress sees
underenforcement as less repugnant than overenforcement”); Dana Milbank,
Spending Request Envisions Long War, WASH. POST, Mar. 25, 2003, at A1 (describing
White House request for $74.7 billion for first six months of Iraqi conflict).
182
See 38 U.S.C. § 4323.
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183

Ex parte Young Action

A further limited exception to a state’s claim of sovereign
184
immunity is a private Ex parte Young action against a state official in
federal court. Ex parte Young essentially created a legal fiction: that a
suit brought against a state officer is not considered a suit against the
185
state that is susceptible to a sovereign immunity defense. However,
Ex parte Young actions are limited to prospective relief, thereby
186
barring money damages for successful plaintiffs.
Although courts
frequently rely on Ex parte Young relief to argue that abrogation is
187
unnecessary to protect employees’ federal rights, it is unclear to
what extent that claim is true.
The prohibition against monetary relief is more than an
inconvenience for state military employees. Lawsuits are expensive,
especially for an individual who is unemployed. Although a state
employer may be wary of a large class of plaintiffs, which is better able
to spread the costs of an Ex parte Young suit, many individuals will
have great difficulty affording litigation that will not achieve
monetary damages. Thus, states will often be able to violate USERRA
without facing this type of suit.
Moreover, even where an employee has the resources to sue, a
state defendant is likely to delay resolution as long as possible. The
only potential harm from an Ex parte Young suit, aside from litigation
costs and the rare negative publicity, is an order to stop breaking the

183

Further, as Justice Souter stated in his Garrett dissent, “the greater the obstacle
the Eleventh Amendment poses to the creation by Congress of the kind of remedy at
issue here—the decentralized remedy of private damage actions—the more
Congress, seeking to cure important national problems . . . will have to rely on more
uniform remedies, such as federal standards and court injunctions, which are
sometimes draconian and typically more intrusive.” Garrett, 531 U.S. at 388 (Souter,
J., dissenting) (internal citations omitted). But see Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 645 (1999) (“The need for uniformity
in the construction of patent law is undoubtedly important, but that is a factor which
belongs to the Article I patent-power calculus, rather than to any determination of
whether a state plea of sovereign immunity deprives a patentee of property without
due process of law.”).
184
209 U.S. 123 (1908).
185
See id. at 159-60; see also Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 114 n.25 (1984) (noting fiction); Jackson, supra note 23, at 511.
186
See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974); Palmatier v. Mich. Dep’t of
State Police, 981 F. Supp. 529, 532 (W.D. Mich. 1997) (approving Ex parte Young
relief for USERRA claim).
187
See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. at 757; Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 71 n.14; Velasquez, 160
F.3d at 394.
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law in the future. State defendants, therefore, have little incentive to
188
settle even strong claims for Ex parte Young relief under USERRA.
In sum, a state employer has little reason not to disregard
USERRA where, at worst, it will generally only have to reinstate or
hire an employee. That incentive, combined with the prohibitive
costs of a lawsuit, leaves state military employees with little more than
189
an empty promise of equitable relief.
With its limited effect, Ex
parte Young fails to stem the damage that state sovereign immunity
claims inflict upon USERRA’s goal of promoting military service.
190
Further, as discussed below, even the limited relief available
under Ex parte Young may no longer be available under a 1998
amendment to USERRA, which appears to have eliminated federal
jurisdiction over all suits against state employers. Thus, if war powers
abrogation is invalidated, state military employees will be barred from
pursuing any private USERRA claim against their employer.
3.

State Military Employment Statutes

State legislation is one alternative that may provide USERRA-like
rights to some state military employees. Not surprisingly, there are
191
significant disparities among the states,
which undermine
USERRA’s attempt to provide a consistent level of protection for
192
military employees.
More important, even among the states that
have enacted statutes similar to USERRA, most are of no help to state
military employees because they fail to permit private rights of action
for monetary damages against the state.

188

But see Velasquez, 160 F.3d at 394 (arguing that states have incentives to protect
their own state militia and Reserve members).
189
See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Ex parte Young . . . is
still available, though effective only where damages remedies are not important.”);
Jackson, supra note 23. Another potential problem with Ex parte Young relief is that
Seminole Tribe further eroded the already limited nature of such actions by holding
that they are not available “[w]here Congress has prescribed a detailed remedial
scheme for the enforcement against a State of a statutorily created right.” Seminole
Tribe, 517 U.S. at 74. Because USERRA does not appear to contain any remedial
provisions detailed enough to proscribe Ex parte Young relief, Seminole Tribe’s holding
in this area should not be a concern. See also Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe, 521 U.S.
261, 287 (1997) (refusing to permit Ex parte Young action in the “special
circumstance[]” where the claim, for title to state submerged lands, would be as
intrusive to state sovereignty as a claim for monetary damages).
190
See infra notes 222-29 and accompanying text.
191
See infra notes 193-99 and accompanying text.
192
See Von Allmen v. Conn. Teachers Ret. Bd., 613 F.2d 356, 360 (2d Cir. 1979)
(“It is clear from the legislative history [of the 1974 amendments extending VRRA to
the states] that Congress intended the amendments to produce uniformity from state
to state . . . .”) (citing S. REP. No. 93-907, at 110 (1974)).
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All states have some type of reemployment or leave of absence
193
guarantees for state military employees called to active duty,
194
It is
although the level of protection can vary dramatically.
193

See ALA. CODE § 31-2-13 (1998) (but see White v. Assoc. Indus. of Ala., Inc., 373
So. 2d 616 (Ala. 1979) (holding statute unconstitutional against private employers));
ALASKA STAT. § 39.20.350 (Michie 2002); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-168(C) (2000 & Supp.
2003); ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 21-4-203, 21-4-212(b)(1), (d), (f)(1) (Michie 1996 & Supp.
2003); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE §§ 395 to 395.03, 395.05, 395.1, 395.3, 395.4 (West
1988 & Supp. 2004); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50-301, 24-50-302, 28-3-601 to 28-3-608
(2001 & Supp. 2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 5-248, 5-255, 27-33 (1998 & Supp. 2003);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 5105 (2003); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 115.01 to 115.15, 295.09
(West 2002 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. § 38-2-279 (1995 & Supp. 2003); HAW.
REV. STAT. § 79-20 (1993) (repealed July 1, 2002, by 2000 Haw. Sess. Laws, Act 253,
§ 132) (retaining the rights granted in the statue if comparable rights are not
provided in collective-bargaining agreement or executive order); IDAHO CODE § 46407 (Michie 2003); 5 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. §§ 325/1, 330/5 (West 1993); IND. CODE
§ 10-2-4-3 (2003); IOWA CODE § 29A.28 (2001 & Supp. 2003); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48517 (Supp. 2002); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 61.373, 61.377, 61.394 (Michie 1993 &
Supp. 2003); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:38 (West 1989 & Supp. 2004); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 37-B, § 342(5)(B) (West 2001 & Supp. 2003) (amended by 2000 Me. Legis.
Serv. 662) (including members of the federal reserves); MD. CODE ANN., STATE PERS.
& PENS. §§ 2-701 to 2-707 (1997); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 33, § 59 (1999) (providing
leaves of absence, but no reemployment rights for public employees); MICH. COMP.
LAWS §§ 35.352, 35.354 (2001); MINN. STAT. §§ 192.26, 192.261 (1992 & Supp. 2004);
MISS. CODE ANN. §§ 33-1-19, 33-1-21 (2000); MO. REV. STAT. §§ 36.370, 41.942,
105.270 (2001 & Supp. 2004); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-604, 10-2-221, 10-2-225
(2003); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 55-160 (providing pay for up to 120 hours), 55-161
(1998); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 281.145, 284.359 (2002 & Supp. 2003); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 112:8, 112:9 (1990); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 38:23-1, 38:23-3, 38:23-4 (West 2002);
N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-4-7, 28-15-1, 28-15-2 (Michie 1978); N.Y. MIL. LAW §§ 242, 243
(McKinney 1990 & Supp. 2004) (providing up to 30 days paid, with escalator clause);
N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 127A-116, 127A-202, 127A-202.1, 127A-203 (2001); N.C. ADMIN.
CODE tit. 25, r.1E.0802 (2003); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 37-01-25, 37-01-25.1 (1987); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 124.29, 5903.01, 5903.02 (West 2003); OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 123:134-04 (2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 44, §§ 208.1, 209 (1996 & Supp. 2004); OR. REV. STAT.
§§ 399.230, 408.240, 408.290 (2001); 51 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 4102, 7304 (1976 & Supp.
2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 36-5-2 (1997); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 8-7-20, 8-7-80, 8-7-90, 25-12250 (Law. Co-op. 1976 & Supp. 2003); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 3-6-19, 3-6-22, 3-6-24
(Michie 1994); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 8-33-102, 8-33-104, 8-33-109 (2002 & Supp.
2003); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 431.005, 613.001 to 613.006, 661.904 (Vernon 1998
& Supp. 2004); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 39-3-1, 39-3-2 (1998 & Supp. 2003); VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 3, § 263 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 2.2-2901, 2.2-2903.1, 44-93, 44-93.1, 44204 (Michie 2001 & Supp. 2003); WASH. REV. CODE § 38.40.060 (2003); W. VA. CODE
§§ 6-11-1, 15-1F-1 (2003); WIS. STAT. §§ 21.80, 230.32, 230.35(3)(a), 230.82 (2003);
WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-11-103, 19-11-106 to 19-11-108, 19-11-111 (Michie 2003).
194
For example, states differ in providing an “elevator” clause like USERRA. See
supra note 76 and accompanying text; compare, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-2-13 (providing
elevator clause); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 29:38 (same); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-604,
10-2-221, 10-2-225 (same); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 124.29, 5903.01, 5903.02 (same);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 39-3-1 (same); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 263 (same), with ALASKA
STAT. § 39.20.350 (lacking elevator clause); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50-301, 24-50-302,
28-3-601 to 28-3-608 (same); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-15-2 (same); N.D. CENT. CODE
§§ 37-01-25, 37-01-25.1 (same). Similarly, states differ wildly in how much paid leave
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questionable whether those protections are meaningful, however,
because few states appear to allow private enforcement with monetary
195
damages against the state employer.
For most state military
they provide, if any. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 31-2-13 (providing up to 168 hours paid);
ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-168(C) (providing 30 days); ARK. CODE ANN. § 21-4-212
(providing 30 days); CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE §§ 395.01, 395.1, 395.3, 395.4 (providing
180 days); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 24-50-301, 24-50-302, 28-3-601 to 28-3-608 (providing
no paid leave); FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 115.01 to 115.15, 295.09 (providing 30 days); GA.
CODE ANN. § 38-2-279 (providing 30 days); HAW. REV. STAT. § 79-20 (providing 15
days); IND. CODE § 10-2-4-3 (providing 15 days); IOWA CODE § 29a.28 (providing 30
days); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 33, § 59 (providing 17 days); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.270
(providing 120 hours); MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-1-604 (providing 15 days); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 55-160 (providing 120 hours); NEV. REV. STAT. § 281.145 (providing 15 days);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 112:9 (providing 15 days); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 38:23-1, 38:23-3,
38:23-4 (providing 90 days for federal service, unlimited for state service); N.M. STAT.
ANN. § 20-4-7 (providing 30 days); N.Y. MIL. LAW §§ 242, 243 (providing 30 days);
OHIO ADMIN. CODE § 123:1-34-04 (providing 22 days); OR. REV. STAT. § 408.290
(providing 15 days); 51 PA. CONS. STAT. § 4102 (providing 15 days); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 8-7-90 (providing 15 days); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 3-6-19, 3-6-22 (stating that pay is
at employer’s discretion); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-33-109 (providing 15 days); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 39-3-2 (providing 15 days); VA. CODE ANN. § 44-93.1 (stating that
employer may supplement pay); WASH. REV. CODE § 38.40.060 (providing 15 days);
W. VA. CODE § 15-1F-1 (providing 30 days); WIS. STAT. § 230.35(3)(a) (providing 30
days); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 19-11-111 (providing 15 days). See generally Samuel W.
Asbury, Comment, A Survey and Comparative Analysis of State Statutes Entitling Public
Employees to Paid Military Leave, 30 GONZ. L. REV. 67 (1994) (discussing state paid leave
statutes, although without looking to state immunity). Other differences include
provisions providing a period of time after which a returning employee can be
terminated only for just cause, or penalties against violators of military employees’
rights. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-168 (stating that violation is a misdemeanor);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 115.15 (stating that violation is removal from office); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 342(5)(B) (stating that violation is a misdemeanor); MISS.
CODE ANN. § 33-1-21 (providing 1 year cause); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 10-2-221, 10-2225 (providing up to 15 days paid, 1 year cause clause, and escalator clause); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 8-33-104 (providing 1 year cause); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 613.004
(providing 1 year cause); UTAH CODE ANN. § 39-3-1 (providing 1 year cause); WIS.
STAT. § 21.80 (providing 180 days cause).
195
Compare COLO. REV. STAT. § 28-3-611 (allowing suit for damages against “any
employer” that violates part of statute that protects public and private employees);
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 20, § 905 (allowing suit for damages against “any employer” that
violates relevant statutes); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 295.14 (allowing suit for damages
available before court or state commission); IDAHO CODE § 46-407(d) (allowing suit
for damages in violation of section that applies to any employer other than the
federal government); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 29:38(D), 29:38.3; MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 35.355; MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-1-226 (allowing state or private enforcement); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 28-15-3; OKLA. STAT. tit. 44, § 208.1 (adopting USERRA, including its
provision for private enforcement against state, 38 U.S.C. § 4323); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 8-33-107; UTAH CODE ANN. § 39-3-1(5); VA. CODE ANN. § 44-93.5; WYO. STAT. ANN.
§ 19-11-121), with NEB. REV. STAT. § 55-161 (adopting much of USERRA, but not its
private right of enforcement provision, 38 U.S.C. § 4323); TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
§§ 431.006 (providing monetary damages only for private employees), 613.021 to
613.023 (providing only equitable relief for public employees); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
§ 3-6-25 (providing only private enforcement to obtain equitable relief). Some of
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employees, therefore, the right to a leave of absence or
reemployment is no better than equitable Ex parte Young relief
196
obtained under USERRA.
197
prohibit military-based
Moreover, only thirteen states

these states, and others, also provide for state enforcement of leave and employment
rights, with varying remedies, against state employers. See, e.g., KAN. STAT. ANN. § 48517(d), (f) (stating that state can prosecute on individual’s behalf); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 35.355 (stating that state enforcement preferred, but permits private
enforcement); MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-1-21(b) (stating that district attorney can
enforce leave of absence protection); MONT. CODE ANN. § 10-1-226 (allowing state or
private enforcement); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-15-3 (allowing state or private
enforcement for damages); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 127A-202.1 (allowing state
enforcement), 127A-203 (allowing monetary award for reemployment for state guard
members); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 124.29 (providing state administrative
enforcement scheme); OR. REV. STAT. § 399.235 (providing state administrative
enforcement scheme); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-33-106 (stating that it can be enforced
by Commissioner of Personnel, in addition to private suit); WIS. STAT. § 21.80(7)
(allowing state to enforce with damages).
196
See supra notes 184-90 and accompanying text. Moreover, even where a private
right of action is provided, it may not be helpful without also providing attorney fees.
See Asbury, supra note 194, at 92 (arguing that states should permit attorney fees for
military employees’ suits to obtain guaranteed paid leave because the damages
involved will often not otherwise make a lawsuit economically feasible).
197
See CAL. MIL. & VET. CODE § 394(b); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 37-B, § 342(5)
(amended by Me. Legis. Serv. 662 (2000)) (including members of the federal
reserves); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.270; NEB. REV. STAT. § 55-161 (adopting USERRA);
NEV. REV. STAT. § 412.606 (prohibiting discrimination against state guard); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 110-B:65 (prohibiting discrimination against guard members); N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-5, 10:5-12; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 127B-12; OKLA. STAT. tit. 44, § 208.1
(adopting USERRA “as state law,” which includes state employers); 51 PA. CONS.
STAT. §§ 7301-7309; UTAH CODE ANN. § 39-3-1 (preventing only discrimination against
employees who return to work after military service); WIS. STAT. §§ 111.32, 111.321,
111.322; WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 19-11-103, 19-11-104. New York does prohibit prejudice
against an employee because of an absence required by military service; however,
that protection is best described as a reemployment right. See N.Y. MIL. LAW § 242
(protecting against “prejudice[], by reason of [a military duty] absence, with
reference to continuance in office or employment, reappointment to office, reemployment, reinstatement, transfer or promotion”); Kitsakos v. Brown, 848 F. Supp.
459, 462 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that N.Y. MIL. LAW § 243 applies “only where
employment would not have been terminated by any intervening cause apart from
absence due to military duty”); Hogan v. N.Y. State Office of Mental Health, 496
N.Y.S.2d 299 (App. Div. 1985) (holding that refusal to hire or discrimination not
actionable under Section 242 unless related to specific absence).
Seventeen other states have antidiscrimination laws, but do not explicitly apply
them to state employers. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 26-167; COLO. REV. STAT. § 28-3-506;
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-571; 20 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 1805/100, 705 § 505/8, 745
§ 5/1; IOWA CODE § 29A.43 (providing no definition of “employer,” but held to
include municipal employees in Bewley v. Villisca, 200 N.W.2d 904 (Iowa 1980)); KAN.
STAT. ANN. §§ 44-1126, 44-1002 (defining “person” as not including state); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 29:38.1 (failing to include state employer, as reemployment does);
MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 33 § 13; MICH. COMP. LAWS § 192.34; MISS. CODE ANN. § 33-1-15;
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 10-1-603, 10-1-615 (stating that violation is a misdemeanor);
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discrimination against state employees.
As with leave and
reemployment statutes, those state anti-discrimination provisions are
undermined by the failure of most states to provide for private
199
enforcement with monetary damages against the state employer.

N.M. STAT. ANN. § 20-4-6 (stating that willful violation is a misdemeanor); R.I. GEN.
LAWS §§ 36-11-2, 36-11-6; TENN. CODE ANN. § 58-1-604; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 3, § 491; VA.
CODE ANN. § 44-93.4 (failing to mention state employee, like leave reemployment
statutes do); WASH. REV. CODE §§ 38.40.040, 38.40.050.
198
States may obviously differ in what they recognize as a valid waiver of immunity
against a private suit, but it is assumed that state courts will not find such a waiver
unless clearly expressed by the legislature. See, e.g., Amantia v. Cantwell, 213 A.2d
251, 254 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965) (holding that plaintiff was entitled to
monetary remedy for violation of paid leave statute, but that it could not mandate
payment because permitting monetary remedies against the state is exclusively within
the legislature’s discretion). Thus, it is also assumed that a statute providing rights to
a military employee will be applicable against a state employer only if there exists an
“express waiver,” as is required for federal jurisdiction over such suits. Alden, 527
U.S. at 724 (“The handful of state statutory and constitutional provisions authorizing
suits or petitions of right against States only confirms the prevalence of the
traditional understanding that a State could not be sued in the absence of an express
waiver, for if the understanding were otherwise, the provisions would have been
unnecessary.”). See generally Ruth Colker & Adam Milani, The Post-Garrett World:
Insufficient State Protection Against Disability Discrimination, 53 ALA. L. REV. 1075, 110205 (2002) (discussing enforcement of state disability laws against state actors).
Indeed, waivers under state legislation may apply to a federal USERRA suit as well,
for at least one state has held that a legislature’s enactment of a statute allowing
private money damages against the state also constitutes a waiver of sovereign
immunity under a federal statute that provides the same rights. See Williamson v.
Dep’t of Human Res., 572 S.E.2d 678, 681 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding that waiver
of immunity under state statute prohibiting disability discrimination constituted
waiver under the ADA).
199
Compare N.H. REV. STAT. ANN § 110-B:65 (providing specifically for money
damages against the state); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 10:5-13, 10:5-38 (providing state or
private enforcement of damage suit); UTAH CODE ANN. § 39-3-1 (providing private
right to enforce only for discrimination against returning employees); WYO. STAT.
ANN. § 19-11-121, with NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 55-161, 55-161.01 (adopting USERRA’s
protections for public employees, but only the Commissioner of Labor can enforce
statute and obtain monetary damages; does not adopt USERRA’s private right of
enforcement provision, 38 U.S.C. § 4323); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 127A-203, 127B-12
(allowing private suit for damages only for reemployment claims); 51 PA. CONS. STAT.
§§ 7301-7309, 42 PA. CONS. STAT. §§ 8521-8522 (lacking a waiver of sovereign
immunity); WIS. STAT. §§ 111.375, 111.39 (only state may seek backpay).
Many states make violations of antidiscrimination laws a crime. See CAL. MIL. &
VET. CODE § 394(g); IOWA CODE ANN. § 29a.43 (failing to clearly prohibit
discrimination in hire); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 37-B § 342(5); MO. REV. STAT. § 105.270
(stating that violation is a misdemeanor; no prohibition against refusal to hire); NEB.
REV. STAT. § 55-165 (stating that violation is a misdemeanor); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 412.606 (same); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 110-B:65; N.C. GEN. STAT. § 127B-13
(same). However, making discrimination a crime does little, if anything, for state
military employees, as it is unlikely that a state attorney general or local prosecutor
has the power, or will, to charge a state agency with a crime. See Colker & Milani,
supra note 198, at 1104 (discussing Alabama law).
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Accordingly, state military employees in the vast majority of
states can enforce their rights only at a potentially significant
200
financial burden.
Additional problems arise from the perception
that state courts are more hostile than federal courts to claims against
201
their own state,
and that state litigation may involve more
202
substantial delays.
Further, the significant number of states that provide the right
to a leave of absence and reemployment, but fail to prohibit
discrimination with regard to hiring, creates a perverse incentive for a
state employer. A manager will be faced with potentially severe
problems associated with hiring a military employee, including
increased leave time and serious health problems that may result
203
from active duty.
Many managers, therefore, may simply avoid
taking on such burdens by refusing to hire members of the Reserves
or National Guard. In the vast majority of states, those employers can
easily discriminate against such applicants, fearing only the potential
204
of future equitable relief.
Although a few states provide their employees with rights as
expansive as USERRA, the majority do not. Military employees of
most states, therefore, are no better off than they would be merely
seeking Ex parte Young relief. Accordingly, state legislation does not
provide an adequate safety net for Congress’s attempt to encourage
military service should the Supreme Court invalidate USERRA’s
205
abrogation of state immunity.
200

See supra notes 186-89 and accompanying text.
See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1115-31 (1977)
(arguing that state courts are generally less open to plaintiffs seeking to exercise
their rights); Kathryn S. Piscitelli, Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida: Can State
Employees Still Sue in Federal Court?, 43 LAB. L.J. 213, 216 (1996) (predicting that “state
courts will probably be less generous than federal courts in awarding damages
against a state”).
202
See, e.g., Hehr & Wallace, supra note 120, at 55 n.115 (noting disadvantages of
suing in state courts); John A. Martin & Nancy C. Maron, Courts, Delay, and
Interorganizational Networks: Managing an Essential Tension, 14 JUST. SYS. J. 268 (1991)
(addressing delays in state litigation).
203
See supra notes 1-2 and accompanying text; see also David Brown, U.S. Acts to
Avert Gulf War Malady; Military Readies Military Tracking System and Better Sensors, WASH.
POST, Jan. 21, 2003, at A1 (noting that approximately 160,000 soldiers may have
suffered “lingering physical symptoms” after the 1991 Gulf War).
204
Although some states make discrimination a crime, none appears to permit
prosecution of state officials. See supra note 199.
205
The lack of protection for military employees in most states also raises the
possibility of a more attenuated alternative—due process abrogation. Under this
theory, Congress may abrogate state immunity pursuant to its due process power
under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59 (holding that
Congress can abrogate pursuant to a valid exercise of its Fourteenth Amendment
201
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State Waiver of Sovereign Immunity

Finally, the Supreme Court has “long recognized that a State’s
sovereign immunity is ‘a personal privilege which it may waive at
206
pleasure.’”
To create such a waiver, a state must have voluntarily
submitted to federal jurisdiction, or made a “clear declaration” that it
207
intends to submit to such jurisdiction.
208
In College Savings Bank, however, the Court limited the ability
of courts to find a waiver. The previous rule was that implicit or
constructive waivers—for example, a court finding a waiver of state
209
immunity based on a state’s operation of an interstate railroad —
were permissible. The Court in College Savings Bank changed course

power); Vazquez, supra note 12, at 1745-63 (describing “abrogation reductio”); see
also Jackson, supra note 23, at 507-10 & nn.53-58; Meltzer, supra note 12, at 49-50 &
nn.230-32. In Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Savings
Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999), the Court recognized the possibility of due process
abrogation, but placed great doubts on Congress’s ability to satisfy the balance
between due process protections and state immunity. Florida Prepaid involved a
patent infringement suit brought against the State of Florida. See id. at 630-32. In
the Patent and Plant Variety Protection Remedy Clarification Act, 35 U.S.C.
§§ 271(h), 296(a) (2000), Congress abrogated state immunity against patent suits
pursuant to its Fourteenth Amendment due process power. See Florida Prepaid, 527
U.S. at 637. The Court expressly acknowledged that due process abrogation could
be valid, see id. at 642; however, it held that the abrogation was not congruent and
proportional to Congress’s Fourteenth Amendment power because there was no
evidence of a pattern of state due process violations, such as patent violations,
without providing some means of redress. Id. at 644-46 (noting also that a due
process violation must be intentional or reckless).
Assuming that USERRA’s protections can be considered a grant of property
rights to military employees—which is unlikely given that Congress never cited its
due process, or any Fourteenth Amendment power with reference to the Act, see
supra note 102—Florida Prepaid raises several interesting issues. For example,
Congress has protected military employees since 1940, see supra note 70, and until
Seminole Tribe, states would have considered themselves liable to individual suits.
Given that a pattern of state violations without due process protection would
obviously be lacking, would the Court require a period where states take advantage
of their immunity by violating USERRA rights without due process before holding
that Congress can validly abrogate state immunity to protect those same rights?
Moreover, although some state laws would protect the hypothetical USERRA
property rights, others would not. See supra notes 189-99 and accompanying text.
Would the Court hold that USERRA’s abrogation was valid with regard to some
states, but not others? Its analysis in other cases suggests that it would not make such
a targeted ruling, but one could question why a statute’s abrogation would be void
even though it was valid in some circumstances. See generally Carlos Manuel Vazquez,
Sovereign Immunity, Due Process, and the Alden Trilogy, 109 YALE L.J. 1927 (2000).
206
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666,
675 (1999) (quoting Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447 (1883)).
207
Id.
208
527 U.S. at 680.
209
Id.

1044

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

Vol. 34:999

and held that “a State’s express waiver of sovereign immunity [must]
210
be unequivocal.”
Thus, if war powers abrogation is
unconstitutional, a state must explicitly waive its immunity for a
private USERRA suit for monetary damages to be available.
An aggrieved employee will have few means, save perhaps public
211
opinion, to force a state to waive its immunity.
Yet, Congress
possesses an easy method of obtaining state waivers. As it has done in
212
other areas, Congress may require states to expressly waive their
immunity against USERRA suits in exchange for related federal
213
money, such as National Guard funding.
Indeed, the Court has
recently reemphasized Congress’s ability to obtain such conditional
214
waivers.
215
Given its recent attempts to amend USERRA, this route
provides Congress with a simple and relatively quick means of
216
reestablishing national protections for military employees. It must
proceed carefully, however. Although tying waivers of immunity to
the acceptance of funds is generally permissible, Congress’s “bribe”
cannot be so coercive as to threaten states’ ability to engage in lawful
217
activities if they choose not to accept the conditional funds.
210

See Parden v. Terminal Ry. of Ala. State Docks Dep’t, 377 U.S. 184, 192 (1964).
See Helen Irvin, A Few States Respond to Garrett Decision, Consider Waiving
Immunity to ADA Lawsuits, 119 DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA), at C-1 (June 21, 2001) (noting
state bills to waive sovereign immunity against disability discrimination suits).
212
See infra note 214.
213
See South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) (holding that Congress can tie
funding to adoption of minimum drinking age laws); Hehr & Wallace, supra note
120, at 57-58; see also Kit Kinports, Implied Waiver After Seminole Tribe, 82 MINN. L. REV.
793, 823-27 (1998) (discussing general restrictions on conditional waivers); Vazquez,
supra note 12, at 1707. See generally Albert J. Rosenthal, Conditional Spending and the
Constitution, 39 STAN. L. REV. 1103 (1987).
214
See Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 (citing Dole, 483 U.S. 203); Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at
686. See generally Rebecca E. Zeitlow, Federalism’s Paradox: The Spending Power and
Waiver of Sovereign Immunity, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 141, 172-82 (2002).
215
See infra notes 222-29 and accompanying text. As noted below, Congress’s most
recent amendment may have inadvertently eliminated federal jurisdiction even
where a state has consented to suit. See infra notes 221-44 and accompanying text.
Any legislation seeking to obtain conditional waivers, therefore, should also make
clear that the federal courts have jurisdiction over private suits against state
employers.
216
See, e.g., Intellectual Property Protection Restoration Act of 2001, S. 1611,
107th Cong. (2001) (bill permitting states to obtain money damages for violations of
their own patents only if they waive sovereign immunity for suits against state
violations of private patents).
217
See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 686; Althouse, supra note 30, at 664-65 (“[T]he
financial inducement offered by Congress might be so coercive as to pass the point at
which pressure turns into compulsion.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing
Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 686); Daniel J. Meltzer, Overcoming Immunity: The Case of
211
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Congress cannot impose waiver on states; rather, a state must
218
voluntarily waive its immunity.
Notwithstanding this limitation, it should be easy for Congress to
avoid an overly coercive waiver. The federal government already
provides a significant amount of money to encourage state
219
employment of military employees, and linking a USERRA waiver of
220
immunity to such funds would be valid.
Despite its simplicity, this
conditional wavier could prove invaluable to state military employees
who would otherwise face discrimination or the loss of their jobs
without monetary relief.
B. USERRA’s Amendment and Its Impact on the State Sovereign
Immunity Exceptions
One additional complication for state military employees could
221
prove quite significant. Congress, in a surprisingly quick response
to Seminole Tribe, attempted to ensure that USERRA would continue
to cover state employers. In the Veterans Programs Enhancement
222
Act of 1998 (“Amendment”), Congress amended USERRA to
Federal Regulation of Intellectual Property, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1331, 1373-79 (2001)
(discussing possible limits of conditional spending waivers, as expressed in South
Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987)). But see Kinports, supra note 213, at 827 (arguing
that this limitation refers only to the amount of money, not the “string” attached).
An extreme example would be a condition that states waive their immunity under
USERRA to receive federal protection in case of an invasion.
218
See Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 704 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[P]erhaps Congress
will be able to achieve the results it seeks . . . by embodying the necessary state
‘waivers’ in federal funding programs—in which case, the Court’s decisions simply
impose upon Congress the burden of rewriting legislation, for no apparent
reason.”). Moreover, conditional waivers could be more difficult in the few states
that cannot waive their immunity absent a constitutional amendment. See infra notes
238-42 and accompanying text; see also John H. Clough, Federalism: The Imprecise
Calculus of Dual Sovereignty, 35 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1, 29-32 (2001) (discussing
requirement that state waiver of immunity comply with state law); Meltzer, supra note
217, at 1331, 1386 n.186 (2001) (“It may be that in a small number of states waiver
can be effected only through constitutional amendment.”) (citing Beasley v. Ala.
State Univ., 3 F. Supp. 2d 1304, 1322-25 (M.D. Ala. 1998) (holding that, in spite of
rule that the legislature cannot waive immunity, waiver may occur through accepting
“bribery” funds by the federal government); Univ. of W. Va. Bd. of Trs. v. Graf, 516
S.E.2d 741, 745 (W. Va. 1998) (holding, in case not addressing conditional waiver,
that under the state constitution, the legislature lacks power to waive state sovereign
immunity)).
219
See, e.g., Jobs for Veterans Act, Pub. L. No. 107-288, 116 Stat. 2033 (2002)
(increasing funding to states to find employment for veterans).
220
See infra note 242.
221
See 144 CONG. REC. H1396, H1398 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Filner) (noting that, “after the problem was identified, we came up with the
consensus rather quickly to solve it for the men and women in our armed forces”).
222
Pub. L. No. 105-368, § 211, 112 Stat. 3315, 3329-31 (1998).
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declare that federal courts “shall have jurisdiction” over an action
brought against a state by the federal government, and that “[i]n the
case of an action against a state (as an employer) by a person, the
action may be brought in a State court of competent jurisdiction in
223
accordance with the laws of the State.”
The Amendment relied, in part, on the principle that, under the
Supremacy Clause, state courts must enforce federal law. As
discussed, however, Alden soon eliminated that doctrine, making
Congress’s attempt to provide a state forum for USERRA actions
224
futile.
In perhaps a greater affront, that attempt may have even
further limited military employees’ ability to pursue USERRA claims
by also eliminating all federal jurisdiction over private suits against a
state employer—including those brought under Ex parte Young or
against a state that has waived its immunity.
That inadvertent harm is illustrated by the subsequent history of
225
the Seventh Circuit’s Velasquez decision, which issued one day after
226
the Amendment was enacted. After the court became aware of the
enactment, it vacated its original decision, which held that Congress
lacked the power to abrogate state immunity under USERRA, and
examined the Amendment’s effect on the plaintiff’s USERRA action.
Chief Judge Posner, writing again for the court, dismissed the action
for lack of jurisdiction because the Amendment mandated that
private USERRA claims against state employers can be heard only in
227
state courts.
Velasquez’s interpretation of the Amendment may appear
puzzling at first.
The language of the Amendment itself is
ambiguous, for it declares only that a military employee may sue in
228
state court, not that a claim must be brought in such a forum.
Congress’s grant of jurisdiction over suits brought by the federal
government on an individual’s behalf was much stronger, stating that
229
federal courts “shall” have jurisdiction over such actions.
The use
of “may,” therefore, could indicate that Congress was merely

223

38 U.S.C. § 4323(b) (2000). This change was to apply to all pending actions.
See id. § 4323(a); Larkins v. Dep’t of Mental Health, No. Civ. A. 97-W-1536-N, 1999
WL 33100500, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 1999).
224
See supra notes 106-19 and accompanying text.
225
See supra notes 101-03 and accompanying text.
226
The Amendment became effective the same day. See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(a).
227
See Velasquez v. Frapwell, 165 F.3d 593, 593 (7th Cir. 1999) (Velasquez II); see
also Larkins, 1999 WL 33100500, at *2 (relying on Velasquez II to hold that the
Amendment deprived federal jurisdiction over claims against states).
228
See 38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(2).
229
See id. § 4323(b)(1).
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providing another jurisdictional option—particularly when examined
under the rule that USERRA is to be construed liberally in favor of
230
military employees.
The contrary interpretation is not without support, however.
First, the language at issue is in a subsection entitled “Jurisdiction,”
which addresses three types of actions: (1) a suit brought against a
state or private employer by the federal government, over which the
federal courts “shall have jurisdiction”; (2) a private suit against a
state employer, which “may be brought” in state court; and (3) a
private action against a private employer, over which the federal
231
courts “shall have jurisdiction.”
The subsection appears to be
232
comprehensive, except for suits against the federal government,
and provides no evidence that it intended private actions against
states to be heard anywhere except in state court. Indeed, the
statement that such a suit “may” be brought in state court can be
explained by the constraint that such suits are permissible only “in
233
accordance with the laws of the State.” The failure to declare that
states “shall” have jurisdiction over such claims may simply be a
recognition that Congress has limited authority to dictate state
courts’ jurisdiction.
Second, the Amendment’s limited legislative history suggests
that Congress’s answer to Seminole Tribe was only to permit the federal
government to pursue suits on behalf of individuals in federal court
and to allow private suits against state employers in state court.
Representative Evans provided a typical explanation of the
Amendment, stating that it “would substitute the United States for an
individual . . . where the Attorney General believes that a State has
not complied with USERRA. . . . Individuals not represented by the
Attorney General would be able to bring enforcement actions in State
234
court.”
There is little in the legislative history to suggest that
230

See supra note 85; see also Ala. Power Co. v. Davis, 431 U.S. 581, 584 (1977)
(discussing VRRA). However, it is also true that statutes granting jurisdiction,
especially where state sovereign immunity is implicated, should be construed
narrowly. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 241 (1985) (“The test
for determining whether a State has waived its immunity from federal-court
jurisdiction is a stringent one.”).
231
38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(1), (2), (3).
232
See id. §§ 4324, 4325.
233
Id. § 4323(b)(3).
234
144 CONG. REC. H1396, H1398 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1998) (statement of Rep.
Evans); see also id. at H1397-98 (statement of Rep. Evans) (stating that the
Amendment provides “the federal government with a means of enforcing service
members’ employment and re-employment rights in federal court,” which “assures
that the federal government’s interest in protecting . . . military personnel can be
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Congress sought to provide federal and state jurisdiction over private
235
claims against states.
Such an intent, even ignoring Alden’s
subsequent bar to state court suits, is troubling. It means that
Congress, in an amendment seeking to expand USERRA rights, also
236
restricted those rights by eliminating both Ex parte Young relief and
federal jurisdiction where a state waives its immunity.
Nevertheless, if the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation is accepted,
a state military employee will have to rely solely on state law or federal
237
prosecution of USERRA, unless war powers abrogation is accepted.
The consequence of that outcome is amply illustrated by Larkins v.
Department of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, in which a USERRA
claim was dismissed from federal court based on the state employer’s
238
sovereign immunity.
After the plaintiff refiled his claim in state
court, the Supreme Court of Alabama held that Congress lacked the
power to abrogate under USERRA, but that the Act’s grant of
jurisdiction to state courts was arguably constitutional under Alden
because jurisdiction existed only “in accordance with the laws of the
239
However, the court then examined whether Alabama law
State.”
permitted USERRA suits against the state, and concluded that it did
240
not. Under Alabama’s constitution, the state “shall never be made
241
a defendant in any court of law or equity.” That immunity cannot
fully exercised in those cases where the employer is a State government”); 144 CONG.
REC. S12,918, S12,934 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1998) (statement of Sen. Rockefeller)
(stating that the Amendment “would substitute the United States for an individual
veteran as the plaintiff in cases where the Attorney General believes that a State has
not complied with USERRA. This restores the ability of veterans who are employed
by a state agency to seek redress for violations of their reemployment rights”).
235
But see 144 CONG. REC. H10,389, H10,391 (daily ed. Oct. 10, 1998) (statement
of Rep. Evans) (“For more than 50 years, Federal law has provided protection for
members of the uniformed services . . . [including] the right to bring an action
against a state or private employer in federal court. . . . This bill restores the
protections and remedies for state employees that existed prior to the Seminole Tribe
decision . . . .”) (emphasis added).
236
One could argue that Ex parte Young relief is still available, because an action
against a state official is not one against the state. However, as noted, section 4323’s
grant of jurisdiction covers only private suits against a “State (as an employer)” or a
“private employer.” An Ex parte Young action is clearly not one against a private
employer, so it either constitutes a suit against a state, or something else entirely, in
which case the statute provides no jurisdiction.
237
See Larkins v. Dep’t of Mental Health & Mental Retardation, 806 So. 2d 358,
361-63 (Ala. 2001) (Larkins II) (holding that under Alden, the state is not liable for
USERRA claim in state court); Hehr & Wallace, supra note 120, at 55.
238
See Larkins v. Dep’t of Mental Health, No. Civ. A. 97-W-1536-N, 1999 WL
33100500, at *2 (M.D. Ala. Feb. 3, 1999) (Larkins I).
239
38 U.S.C. § 4323(b)(2) (2000); Larkins II, 806 So. 2d at 363.
240
See Larkins II, 806 So. 2d at 363.
241
ALA. CONST. art. I, § 14; Larkins II, 806 So. 2d at 363. Indeed, under Alden, all
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be waived by “the Legislature or by any other state authority,” and
state courts lack jurisdiction over any action that is contrary to the
242
state’s immunity.
Accordingly, Alabama could not be held liable
under USERRA unless it amended its constitution to allow such
claims.
The potential elimination of federal jurisdiction—and, as Larkins
and Alden demonstrate, probably state jurisdiction as well—
underscores the need for Congress to amend USERRA to ensure a
243
forum for claims against all state employers. One irony is that the
statute in its present form could help state military employees bring
USERRA suits in state court. In Alden, as it has elsewhere, the
Supreme Court relied in part on the availability of Ex parte Young
relief in holding that Congress could not abrogate the state’s
244
immunity in its own courts. The elimination of that alternative may
provide an additional ground for concluding that USERRA’s
abrogation constitutes an exception to the general prohibition
against abrogation under Article I.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s burgeoning state sovereign immunity
jurisprudence has significantly affected state employees, who have
lost the ability to pursue private claims for damages against their
nonconsenting state employers in a variety of federal employment
statutes. Although the interests of those employees, and the nation,
in ensuring state compliance are significant, they may pale in
comparison to the national concerns embodied in USERRA. The
need to encourage participation in the armed forces is always
important, yet rarely is it so vital as when the nation is consumed with
245
military needs both abroad and at home.
That concern is not a
mere matter of public policy, for it also directly implicates the Court’s
states have such immunity unless expressly waived.
242
Larkins II, 806 So. 2d at 363 (citing Ala. State Docks Terminal Ry. v. Lyles, 797
So. 2d 432, 434-35 (Ala. 2001); Druid City Hosp. Bd. v. Epperson, 378 So. 2d 696
(Ala. 1979)).
243
See infra note 246.
244
See supra note 187.
245
See Vernon Loeb & Thomas E. Ricks, For Army, Fears of Postwar Strife, WASH.
POST, Mar. 11, 2003, at A1 (noting that the Army had fallen short of its reserve
recruiting goals in January and February 2003 because of increasingly long
deployments); see also Eric Schmitt, Soft Economy Aids Army Recruiting Effort, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 22, 2003, at A1 (stating that the weak economy allowed all of the armed services
to meet their recruiting goals for fiscal year 2003, but that military officials expected
difficulties in the future because of the Iraq conflict—particularly for enrollment in
the National Guard and Reserves).
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abrogation analysis.
The Court’s explicit balancing of interests has generally weighed
in favor of state immunity over congressional attempts to abrogate
that immunity. War powers abrogation, however, may represent a
stopping point. The desire for uniform, national war powers was a
critical goal of the Constitutional Convention.
War powers,
therefore, not only provides an important policy consideration for
the Court, but also constitutes a limited area in which the states did
not expect to retain immunity where the federal government acted.
That conclusion holds even in the face of the Court’s broad
dicta stating that Congress can never abrogate state immunity under
Article I.
The Court has never addressed abrogation under
Congress’s war powers; thus, its dicta fail to acknowledge the
exceptional nature of those powers. The understanding of the
Founders, the Court’s holdings with regard to states’ war powers, and
the Constitution’s extraordinary grant of power to the federal
government vis-à-vis the states, all provide compelling evidence, even
under the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence, that war powers
abrogation is valid.
Should the Court strike down USERRA’s war powers abrogation,
however, state military employees have few options that adequately
protect the rights underlying the Act. The Court’s own exceptions—
claims brought by the federal government or those seeking only Ex
parte Young relief—are inadequate, and the vast majority of states do
not permit private suits for monetary damages in their own
legislation. Congress does have one relatively simple option: it can
require states to waive their immunity against USERRA claims in
exchange for related federal funding. Such legislation, which could
also amend USERRA to make clear that federal courts have
jurisdiction over suits brought by state employees, would fully protect
the goals of USERRA by once again bringing state employers under
246
its reach.
By doing so, Congress could circumvent the threat to
246

Following informal distributions of an earlier version of this Article, several
Democratic senators introduced a bill that, among numerous other changes, would
amend USERRA as this Article recommends. See Fairness and Individual Rights
Necessary to Ensure a Stronger Society: Civil Rights Act of 2004, S. 2088, 108th Cong.
(2d Sess. 2004) (permitting, for example, private rights of action under Title VI and
IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, allowing punitive damages under the ADA, and
creating a conditional waiver of state immunity under FLSA, ADA, ADEA, Title VI,
and Title IX). The Fairness Act would grant federal jurisdiction over private
USERRA claims brought against states and would condition receipt of federal funds
on states’ waiver of sovereign immunity against USERRA claims. See id. § 201(b)(2)
(“In the case of an action against a State (as an employer) by a person, the action
may be brought in a district court of the United States or State court of competent
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USERRA raised by the Court’s sovereign immunity jurisprudence and
reassert its judgment that the nation’s military readiness requires that
all soldiers—even those who work, or seek to work, for state
employers—be able to serve in the military without impairing their
civilian employment opportunities.

jurisdiction.”); id. § 201(b)(3) (“A State’s receipt or use of Federal financial
assistance for any program or activity of a State shall constitute a waiver of sovereign
immunity, under the 11th amendment to the Constitution or otherwise, to a suit
brought by an employee of that program or activity under this chapter for the rights
or benefits authorized the employee by this chapter.”).

